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THE ARBITRABILITY OF DOMESTIC ANTITRUST
DISPUTES: WHERE DOES THE LAW STAND?
INTRODUCTION
Arbitration has rapidly become the preferred method of alternative
dispute resolution ("ADR") in modern American society.' Arbitra-
tion involves the voluntary submission of a dispute to a theoretically
neutral third party, who then resolves the dispute by rendering a final
and binding decision. 2 Although arbitration has historically been dis-
favored by the judiciary,3 the numerous benefits of arbitration as an
alternative to litigation were recognized by Congress in the passage of
the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (the "FAA"). 4 Among other
things, the FAA assures parties submitting disputes to arbitration that
the arbitrator's decision will be final and binding except in certain nar-
row circumstances warranting judicial review.5 While the FAA and
numerous federal judicial decisions recognize the strong federal policy
favoring arbitration, 6 until quite recently, certain classes of statutory
claims have been exempted from the coverage of general mandatory
arbitration clauses on public policy grounds.7
1. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION FOR THE 1990S 1 (Richard Medalie ed. 1991).
2. See FRANCES KELLOR, ARBITRATION IN ACTION 3 (1941).
3. See Earl Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV.
132, 138 (1934); see also Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983
(2d Cir. 1942) (suggesting that the traditional judicial antipathy toward arbitration was the result
of the judiciary's self-interest in securing an optimal level of case fees from litigants).
4. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, Pub. L. No. 401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14
(1982)).
5. The finality of the arbitrator's decision is subject to limited judicial review only in those
cases in which "such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9
U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
6. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). There
is a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." Id. at 24. "The Arbitration Act
establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration .... Id. at 24-25.
7. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (holding that claims arising under section 14 of
the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") are inarbitrable); Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten,
Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1986) (recognizing that the quasi-criminal
nature of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") claims necessitates a
judicial forum to ensure compliance with constitutional safeguards; hence, RICO claims are in-
arbitrable); Zimmerman v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 712 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding that
bankruptcy claims are inappropriate subjects of arbitration); American Safety Equip. Corp. v.
J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that antitrust disputes are not appropri-
ate subjects of arbitration).
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One such class of statutory claims previously excluded from the
reach of mandatory arbitration clauses are federal antitrust disputes.8
The federal antitrust laws are concerned with the promotion of free
and unfettered competition in the marketplace, as well as the prohibi-
tion of certain types of anticompetitive practices.9 Because antitrust
disputes often involve strong underlying policy implications, 10 such
claims have traditionally been treated by the courts as requiring
purely judicial resolution."
Nevertheless, the judicial antipathy toward the arbitrability of anti-
trust disputes has all but disappeared in light of recent United States
Supreme Court decisions.12 In light of the Court's evolving position
on this issue, numerous lower courts have declared domestic antitrust
disputes to be arbitrable. 13 Other courts have relied on a more tradi-
tional contract analysis in approaching this issue 14 by maintaining that
antitrust disputes are subject to arbitration only if they fall within the
scope of the contractual arbitration clause.15
8. Federal antitrust claims typically arise under one of the following statutory provisions: the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982), the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982), the Robinson-
Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b (1982), and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 41-46, 47-58 (1982). Although most states have their own respective versions of antitrust and
fair competition laws, the focus of this Comment will be primarily upon the federal antitrust
provisions.
9. See PHILLIP AREEDA, Arrrusr ANALYSIS §§ 103-106 (2d ed. 1974).
10. See American Safety, 391 F.2d at 826. "A claim under the antitrust laws is not merely a
private matter. The Sherman Act is designed to promote the national interest in a competitive
economy; thus, the plaintiff asserting his rights under the Act has been likened to a private
attorney-general who protects the public's interest." Id.
11. See, e.g., id. at 821; Lake Communications, Inc. v. ICC Corp., 738 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir.
1984); Applied Digital Tech., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1978); Helfen-
bein v. Int'l Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir. 1971); Power Replacements, Inc. v. Air Pre-
heater Co., 426 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1970).
12. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
The Supreme Court in Mitsubishi held that antitrust disputes arising in the international com-
mercial context could be arbitrated if so provided by the parties' agreement. Id. at 629.
Although the Court specifically limited its holding to the international commercial context, the
Court took definite exception to the Second Circuit's reasoning in American Safety as applied to
international transactions. Id. at 632-36. However, the Court did refuse to expressly overrule
the Second Circuit's decision, finding it "unnecessary to assess the legitimacy of the American
Safety doctrine as applied to agreements to arbitrate arising from domestic transactions." Id. at
629.
13. See, e.g., Nghiem v. NEC Elecs., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1994); Syscomm Int'l Corp. v.
Synoptics Communications, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 135 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Western Int'l Media Corp. v.
Johnson, 754 F. Supp. 871 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
14. Coors Brewing Co. v. Molson Breweries, 51 F.3d 1511 (11th Cir. 1995); Santa Cruz Med.
Clinic v. Dominican Santa Cruz Hosp., No. C93 20613, 1995 WL 232410, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
17, 1995); Swensen's Ice Cream Corp. v. Corsair Corp., 942 F.2d 1307 (8th Cir. 1991).
15. "An arbitration clause 'does not extend to all disputes of any sort.., but only to disputes
touching specified provisions of the agreement."' Coors Brewing Co., 51 F.3d at 1516 (quoting
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The trend toward the arbitrability of domestic antitrust disputes has
not been unanimous, however. Indeed, some lower courts have con-
tinued to apply a strict policy of inarbitrability when confronted with
such disputes. 16 These courts continue to stress the dangers that pri-
vate arbitration poses to the public interests underlying antitrust dis-
putes. 17 As a result, courts adopting this philosophy continually
refuse to compel arbitration of domestic antitrust disputes, even
where the parties to the dispute are bound by contractual arbitration
clauses that may suggest otherwise.
This Comment will commence with a brief examination of both
commercial arbitration and antitrust law. 18 Following this brief over-
view, this Comment will then examine relevant precedents and at-
tempt to establish the current state of the law in the area of antitrust
arbitration. 19 Finally, this Comment will suggest that the public policy
concerns underlying domestic antitrust disputes may be effectively
vindicated through the arbitral process, provided that such disputes
stem from, and fall within, the scope of the contract between the par-
ties.20 If such disputes do not clearly fall within the scope of the par-
ties' contract, then the dispute should not be arbitrable absent an
express post-dispute agreement to arbitrate the antitrust issues. 21 Ad-
ditionally, certain procedural and judicial safeguards will be necessary
to ensure that the strong public interests underlying effective antitrust
enforcement are properly vindicated through the private arbitral
process.22
the First Circuit's opinion in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d
155, 159 (1st Cir. 1983)).
16. Kotam Elecs., Inc. v. JBL Consumer Prods., 59 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 1995); Stendig Int'l,
Inc. v. B. & B. Italia, S.p.A., 633 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y; 1986).
17. The public policy rationale underlying domestic antitrust disputes concerns the broad na-
tional interest in unfettered competition in the capitalistic marketplace, Which is at the very heart
of antitrust law. See AREEDA, supra note 9, §§ 103-106. The courts have been cognizant of the
importance of private enforcement, including the treble damages remedy, as an effective deter-
rent to anticompetitive activities. See, e.g., American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co.,
391 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1968) (recognizing the broad national interest in competition and the
widespread effects antitrust violations can have on consumers in general).
18. See infra notes 23-159 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 160-254 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 255-328 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 180-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth Circuit's approval of
post-dispute arbitration agreements).
22. See infra Part IV.C.2 and accompanying text.
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF ARBITRATION AS A PREFERRED METHOD
OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
For various reasons, arbitration has gradually, but definitively, come
to be the preeminent method of ADR. Despite a lengthy history of
judicial opposition to the arbitral process, commercial arbitration has
been generally favored by the business community as an efficient
means of dispute resolution.23 The growing federal policy favoring ar-
bitration is a direct result of the numerous benefits associated with
arbitration as compared to conventional litigation.24
A. Arbitration: Its Nature and Purpose
Arbitration 25 is designed to render a final and binding resolution of
disputes without resort to the much maligned judicial process. 26 The
desirability of arbitration as an alternative to litigation stems from the
fact that arbitration allows the parties to delve "deep into the causes,
sift[ ] the facts and, unhampered by legal technicalities, see[ I that jus-
tice is administered. '27 Unlike other forms of ADR, arbitration offers
a complete array of benefits including finality, expediency, privacy,
and financial efficiency.28 In the vast majority of cases, the arbitra-
tor's decision will have the same legally binding effect as a judicial
determination. 29 In order to be effective, the arbitral process must
23. See generally Frank E. Massengale & Karen K. Whitfield, Arbitration: Be Careful What
You Wish For, 44 LA. B.J. 120, 120-21 (1996).
24. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
25. Arbitration is defined as "[a]n arrangement for taking and abiding by the judgment of
selected persons in some disputed matter, instead of carrying it to the established tribunals of
justice, and is intended to avoid the formalities, the delay, the expense and vexation of ordinary
litigation." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 105 (6th ed. 1990).
26. See KELLOR, supra note 2, at 3.
27. Id. at 4.
28. Id.; see Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275-76 (1982)
(noting the inherent delay and expense that are necessarily and inescapably associated with for-
mal litigation); see also Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 850
(1961) (noting the expediency and reduced costs associated with arbitration as compared to liti-
gation). For an economic analysis of the possible benefits of arbitration, see Mark R. Lee, Anti-
trust and Commercial Arbitration: An Economic Analysis, 62 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 1, 2 (1987)
(stating that "promises to arbitrate are valuable only in so far as they permit the beneficiaries to
economize on transaction costs"). As a cursory review of related materials indicates, there is
almost universal consensus that arbitration is preferable to litigation from a practical standpoint
in most cases.
29. KELLOR, supra note 2, at 4; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). The text of section 2, specifically
providing for the enforceability of arbitration decisions, reads as follows:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such
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abide by several fundamental principles, including voluntary submis-
sion, good faith, and an intention to be bound by the decision.30
Commercial arbitration involves the settlement of disputes arising
under business agreements. 31 Arbitration may be applied to a wide
variety of commercial transactions including sales and purchases, cor-
porate and partnership relations, licensing agreements, insurance dis-
putes, leases, and labor issues.32 The popularity of commercial
arbitration stems from the business community's clear preference for
an expeditious and effective method of resolving disagreements.33
The submission of a commercial dispute to arbitration is generally un-
dertaken pursuant to a contractual arbitration provision, an agree-
ment between the parties, or by a judicial order.34
Once the decision to arbitrate is made, the parties must select the
arbitrator, or arbitrators, as the case may be. The selection process is
considered one of the most important aspects of the entire process. 35
The selection can be done through mutual agreement,36 the use of an
independent administrative agency,37 judicial appointment, 38 or by
a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2.
30. See KELLOR, supra note 2, at 7-9. Kellor notes that agreements to submit disputes to
arbitration must be voluntary, and not the products of coercion, duress, or misunderstanding. Id.
This principle will become important later with respect to broad arbitration clauses and unfore-
seen antitrust disputes between the contracting parties. A problem that often arises in this con-
text occurs where a party finds itself forced to arbitrate an antitrust dispute (which it would not
otherwise desire to arbitrate) solely by virtue of a broadly construed arbitration clause.
Assuming that a contract containing an arbitration clause was entered into voluntarily, then it
follows, according to Kellor, that the agreement to arbitrate was also entered into voluntarily,
absent a contract defense attacking the validity of the contract itself. Id. Additionally, Kellor
argues that the good faith of the parties is necessary in order for the parties to accept the arbitra-
tion decision as final and binding. Id. Such good faith is also needed to ensure that the parties
fulfill the conditions of the arbitral award. Id. However, the good faith of the parties becomes
much less important in the modem commercial context where arbitral awards are backed by
threat of judicial sanctions provided for in the Federal Arbitration Act (the "FAA"). See infra
notes 82-97.
31. KELLOR, supra note 2, at 4.
32. See MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.01 (rev. ed. 1989).
33. Id. § 2.01.
34. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION FOR THE 1990s, supra note 1, at 17-18.
35. Id. at 27; see also DOMKE, supra note 32, § 20.00. "The arbitrator is the decisive element
in any arbitration. His ability, expertness, and fairness are at the base of the arbitration process.
The success or failure of an arbitration will largely depend on him." DOMKE, supra note 32,
§ 20.00.
36. DOMKE, supra note 32, § 20.00. This occurs where the parties mutually agree on who will
be appointed as arbitrators for the particular dispute, often in consideration of the respective
qualifications and experiences of the potential arbitrators.
37. Id. For example, the American Arbitration Association (the "AAA") often engages in
the appointment of arbitrators for parties desiring such an appointment. For more on the AAA,
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naming potential arbitrators in the contract itself.39 Once the selec-
tion process is complete, the proceedings may begin.4 0 Arbitration
proceedings, not unlike judicial proceedings, give the parties an equal
opportunity to present their respective cases, including the submission
of evidence and the calling of witnesses. 41
Arbitrators are not usually bound by the intricate and exhaustive
legal rules governing procedural and evidentiary matters. 42 Obvi-
ously, the lack of formalistic procedural and evidentiary guidelines
fuels the initial attraction of many parties to the arbitral process.43
However, arbitration is the target of a few relevant criticisms. The
arbitration process has been accused of lacking the legitimacy associ-
ated with judicial forums because the arbitral tribunals are often tem-
porary associations created solely to resolve specific disputes.44 In
addition, because arbitration decisions are final and generally not sub-
ject to judicial review, there is a legitimate fear that injustices ren-
dered through arbitral decisions may go unresolved.4 5
Arbitration has been characterized by the Supreme Court as being
a creature of contract.4 6 It is the general rule that parties cannot be
required to submit disputes to arbitration unless they have agreed to
do so.4 7 However, the standard arbitration clause inserted into con-
see FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTION, AND ACHIEVE-
MENTS 22 (1948).
38. DOMKE, supra note 32, § 20.00. The FAA provides for the judicial appointment of arbitra-
tors when necessary. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1982).
39. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1982). This practice has the advantage of alerting the parties beforehand of
any potential problems that may arise concerning the naming of mutually acceptable arbitrators
in the event of a dispute. Additionally, it gives the parties the option to ensure that competent
or expert arbitrators will be present at the arbitral proceeding.
40. Id.
41. Id. § 7.
42. See DOMKE, supra note 32, § 1.01.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. Indeed, this is the very concern at the heart of the dispute concerning the arbitrability
of domestic antitrust claims. There remains a fear that submitting such claims to arbitration
would result in the subrogation of the public interest in free competition to individual compro-
mise. See, e.g., American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maquire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826-27 (2d
Cir. 1968) (recognizing the danger that the strong public interests underlying antitrust disputes
would not be effectively vindicated through the private arbitral process). As a result, whatever
solution is reached regarding this issue, it must take into account the fact that arbitral decisions
are generally not substantively reviewable.
46. See, e.g., AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (1986);
Drake Batteries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery & Confectionary Workers Int'l, 370 U.S. 254
(1962); Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
47. See Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 241 (holding that a party cannot be forced to arbitrate that
which he has not contractually agreed to arbitrate).
[Vol. 46:779
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tracts, and recommended by the American Arbitration Association
(the "AAA"),48 is rather broad, requiring the submission to arbitra-
tion of all disputes arising under the contract.49
Disputes arise under an agreement when their resolution depends
upon the judicial construction given to the contract.50 Not surpris-
ingly, the broad and inclusive language of the standard arbitration
clause, coupled with the difficulty of determining whether a dispute
"arises under" a contract, has engendered considerable difficulty in
interpretation and application.51 This is particularly evident in the
area of antitrust arbitration, where the parties often fail to consider
the possibility of future antitrust disputes. 52 Before considering these
potentially perplexing issues, however, a brief overview of the respec-
tive histories of commercial arbitration and antitrust law will prove
helpful.
B. A Brief History of Commercial Arbitration
Arbitration has served as a useful method for resolving countless
disputes since the dawn of primitive society.53 In one form or another,
48. The AAA was formed as a vehicle for stimulating the "public interest and opinion in
support of the general acceptance of arbitration." KELLOR, supra note 37, at 22. As such, the
AAA created and maintained a national system of arbitration for the benefit of disputing par-
ties. Id. at 23. Additionally, the AAA creates and applies commercial arbitration rules in order
to ensure a valid and competent framework for structuring arbitral proceedings and awards. See
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION FOR THE 1990s, supra note 1, at 78.
49. A sample broad arbitration clause states:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the breach
thereof, shall be settled by arbitration, in accordance with the Rules, then obtaining, of
[name of agency administering arbitration], and judgment upon the award rendered by
the Arbitrator(s) may be entered in any Court having jurisdiction thereof.
DOMKE, supra note 32, § 5.03.
50. See Sweet Dreams Unlimited, Inc. v. Dial-a-Mattress Int'l, Ltd., 1 F.3d 639, 642-43 (7th
Cir. 1993) (stating that "'arising out of' reaches all disputes having their origin or genesis in the
contract, whether or not they implicate interpretation or performance of the contract per se");
Mediterranean Enters., Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that
an arbitration clause applying to disputes "arising hereunder" is applicable only to those disputes
relating to "the interpretation and performance of the contract itself").
51. The difficulty associated with the interpretation of arbitration clauses often hinges on
mere semantics. Compare Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406
(1967) (disputes "arising out of or relating to" the contract encompass claims that the agreement
was fraudulently induced), with Mediterranean Enters., 708 F.2d at 1464 (arbitration clause ap-
plying to disputes "arising hereunder" is much narrower, applying only to those disputes involv-
ing contractual interpretation and performance). Hence, following the reasoning applied by
these courts, the omission of the phrase "relating to" removes fraudulent inducement from the
scope of the arbitration clause.
52. See generally Donald I. Baker & Mark R. Stabile, Arbitration of Antitrust Claims: Oppor-
tunities and Hazards for Corporate Counsel, 48 Bus. LAW. 395 (1993).
53. KELLOR, supra note 37, at 3. See generally Frank D. Emerson, History of Arbitration
Practice and Law, 19 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 155, 155-56 (1970) (recalling the ancient biblical fable of
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arbitration has been a historically favored method for resolving a wide
variety of disagreements, including personal disputes in ancient
Greece, 54 international political conflicts between Mediterranean na-
tion-states, 55 and wage disputes among seamen in colonial America.
56
Indeed, commercial arbitration was a common method of dispute res-
olution among Phoenician and Greek merchants. 57
Commercial arbitration probably did not solidify into a commer-
cially desirable practice in the English legal system, however, until it
was employed as a means of resolving commercial disputes by medie-
val merchant guilds.58 Guild members were required to bring all dis-
putes before the guild in order to seek effective resolution.5 9 Like
modern arbitration proceedings, the guild decisions involved speedy,
informal, and binding decisions. 60 Unlike modern arbitration prac-
tices, however, submission to the guild's dispute resolution authority
was not voluntary.61 Nonetheless, given that these proceedings devel-
oped as a means of avoiding the pitfalls of conventional litigation, in-
cluding expense, delay, possible interruption of trade, and the
negative impact on business goodwill,62 it is likely that these proceed-
ings foreshadowed the evolution of modern commercial arbitration.63
King Solomon, who arbitrated a maternal dispute between two recent mothers concerning the
ownership of a single living child; when one mother agreed with Solomon's outlandish sugges-
tion that the child be divided in half, Solomon promptly awarded the child to the other mother).
54. KELLOR, supra note 37, at 3. In the Homeric period, chiefs and elders often settled dis-
putes between conflicting parties. Id. In the sixth century B.C. in Athens, Peisistratus author-
ized arbitrators to go throughout the city, settling interpersonal disputes whenever necessary.
Id.
55. Id. at 4. In 600 B.C., in a territorial dispute between Athens and Megara concerning the
island of Salamis, Spartan judges awarded the island to Athens. Id. In 480 B.C., a dispute be-
tween Corinth and Corcyra over Leucas was arbitrated by Themistocles. Id.
56. Id. at 5. This dispute was arbitrated by the Chamber of Commerce of New York, the first
official American arbitration tribunal. Id.
57. Id. It was also a fairly common practice among the desert caravans of the Marco Polo era.
Id.
58. See Wolaver, supra note 3, at 133-35 (stating that such guilds were created pursuant to a
mercantile charter from the royalty and hinged the right to engage in the business upon guild
membership); see also Mentschikoff, supra note 28, at 854-55 (noting the importance of self-
contained trade group arbitration as a precursor to modem commercial arbitration).
59. Wolaver, supra note 3, at 134.
60. Id. at 137.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 144-45.
63. But see id. at 137. Wolaver argues that due to the involuntary nature of these proceedings,
as well as the unduly rigid rules followed by some of these commercial guilds, such proceedings
cannot be characterized as arbitration in the modem sense, which generally requires voluntary
submission by the parties involved. Id.
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English common law generally treated contractual arbitration
clauses as revocable. 64 The rule of revocability is thought to have
originated from Lord Coke's dictum in Vynior's Case.65 Later deci-
sions supported the general rule of revocability and offered distinct
rationales in support of this presumption. 66 The hostility of the com-
mon law courts toward arbitration is likely due to a combination of
several factors, including the dependence of common law judges on
case fees for income, 67 interforum competition among the judiciary,68
and efforts to institutionalize the legal profession.69 However, the
traditional hostility of the English judges toward arbitration has been
greatly tempered with the passage of time. Indeed, subsequent Eng-
lish legislation, including the Common Law Procedure Act of 185470
and the Arbitration Act of 1889,71 not only recognized the legitimacy
of arbitration, but permitted arbitrators to submit their decisions to
the courts for review. 72 Interestingly, under the English statutes, both
the procedural and substantive aspects of the arbitral process may be
subject to judicial review. 73
64. Id. at 138.
65. 77 Eng. Rep. 597 (K.B. 1609). "[I]f I submit myself to arbitriment ... yet I may revoke it
for my act, or my words cannot alter the judgment of the law to make that irrevocable which is
of its own nature revocable." Id. at 599-600.
66. See Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B. 1746) (finding that arbitration agreements are
revocable because they "oust" the courts from jurisdiction); see also Wellington v. MacKintosh,
26 Eng. Rep. 741 (Ch. 1743) (refusing to grant discovery to an arbitral panel). But see Halfhide
v. Fenning, 29 Eng. Rep. 187 (Ch. 1788) (recognizing the competency of skilled arbitrators to
evaluate complex issues).
67. John R. Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced
Accommodation of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C. L. REv. 219, 224 (1986). Allison points
to Lord Campbell's suggestion in Scott v. Avery, 10 Eng. Rep. 1121 (K.B. 1856), that because
English judges had no fixed salary, they were entirely dependent upon case fees for income. Id.
Hence, it was in the judiciary's self-interest to condemn arbitration since any alternative to litiga-
tion directly threatened the economic compensation of judges.
68. Id. A contributing factor was the competition occurring primarily between the older An-
glo-Saxon courts and the upstart Norman courts that evolved following the Norman Conquest of
1066. Id. The Norman courts, which eventually developed into the common law judiciary, faced
stiff and continuous competition from the older Anglo-Saxon courts. Id. Hence, the common
law courts likely viewed arbitration as yet another outside challenge, both to their legitimacy and
to their jurisdictional powers. Id. at 224-25.
69. Id. at 224. Allison notes that the judiciary's attempts to professionalize included the adop-
tion of intricate procedural requirements necessary for effective litigation. Id. The complexity
of these procedures, however, created a disincentive toward litigation. Id. Since arbitration
lacked these complex procedural formalities, there was a perceived danger that arbitration might
overtake the courts as the preferred method of dispute resolution. Id. at 224-25.
70. 17 & 18 Vict., ch. 125 § 5.
71. 52 & 53 Vict., ch. 49 § 7.
72. Mentschikoff, supra note 28, at 855.
73. Id. at 856.
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The development of arbitration in America did not mirror the Eng-
lish experience. 74 Arbitral proceedings did occur with some degree of
frequency in trade exchanges, trade associations, and the New York
Chamber of Commerce. 75 Unlike English law, American law did not,
and for all intents and purposes, still does not, permit judicial review
of the substantive aspects of arbitral proceedings. 76 Although there
may be narrow exceptions for procedural errors,77 mistakes in the ap-
plication of substantive law generally do not permit the vacating of
arbitral awards. 78
Despite the sporadic early use of arbitration, arbitration has
evolved into a legitimate and effective method of dispute resolution
by the early Twentieth Century. In 1920, New York became the first
state to adopt a modern arbitration statute.79 Shortly thereafter, in
1922, the AAA was founded as a vehicle for encouraging and legiti-
mizing arbitration. 80 This trend would culminate in the passage of the
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925.81
C. The Federal Arbitration Act and the Growing Policy
Favoring Arbitration
Congress passed the FAA 82 in order to legitimize arbitration and
give it statutory status as an acceptable form of ADR.83 The key pro-
vision of the FAA is section 2, which provides for the irrevocability
and enforceability of arbitration agreements with only minor excep-
tions.84 The FAA expressly provides for the participation of the fed-
eral judiciary in the enforcement of arbitral awards by requiring
74. Id. at 855.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 856. Indeed, Mentschikoff notes that the earliest modem arbitration statute, the
New York Arbitration Act of 1920, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1920, ch. 275, § 2, specifically excluded
errors of law as a basis for setting aside arbitral awards. Id. The FAA provided for a modifica-
tion of an arbitral award "[w]here the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the
merits of the controversy." 9 U.S.C. § 11(c) (1982). Hence, the statutory language expressly
excludes award modifications based on substantive errors.
77. 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 10, 11.
78. Mentschikoff, supra note 28, at 856. The general judicial refusal to substantively evaluate
arbitral awards is exemplified by the FAA, examined more closely in Part I.C. The FAA pro-
vides for a more substantive review in only the narrowest of circumstances. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2,
10, 11 (1982).
79. Act of Apr. 19, 1920, ch. 275, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803 (codified in N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R.
7501-7514 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1995)).
80. KELLOR, supra note 37, at 61.
81. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14.
82. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, Pub. L. No. 401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14
(1982)).
83. 1947 U.S. Code Cong. Serv., p. 1515 (Apr. 14, 1947).
84. 9 U.S.C. § 2. For the complete text of this section, see supra note 29.
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courts, in cases involving arbitration agreements, to stay litigation on
arbitrable issues,85 to issue orders compelling arbitration, 86 and to ap-
point arbitrators when necessary. 87 Most importantly, to ensure com-
pliance with the arbitral process, the FAA gives the arbitrators legally
enforceable powers to summon persons, documents, records, and pa-
pers.88 Finally, the Act's pro-arbitration stance is evidenced by its
procedures for vacating arbitral awards, which are limited to only a
few non-substantive possibilities. 89
By generally not allowing for substantive review, the FAA strongly
favors the employment of arbitration as an alternative to litigation. It
includes strong provisions establishing enforceability and irrevocabil-
ity of arbitration agreements, 90 the granting of broad subpoena pow-
ers to arbitrators, 91 and the minimization of grounds for review.92
Although the Supreme Court did enforce some arbitration agree-
ments prior to the passage of the FAA, 93 the Court generally refused
to enforce agreements to arbitrate future disputes94 on the theory that
such an agreement deprived the aggrieved party of the right to a judi-
cial remedy.95 Following the Act's passage, the federal judiciary was
85. 9 U.S.C. § 3. Section 3 provides, in relevant part:
The court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in
such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on
application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has
been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement ....
Id.
86. Id. § 4. Section 4 provides, in relevant part, that "[a] party ... may petition any United
States district court ... for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner pro-
vided for in such agreement." Id.
87. Id. § 5. Section 5 provides, in relevant part, that "if no method be provided therein ... the
court shall designate and appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require
.... " Id.
88. Id. § 7. Section 7 provides, in relevant part:
The arbitrators selected either as prescribed in this title or otherwise, or a majority of
them, may summon in writing any person to attend before them or any of them as a
witness and in a proper case to bring with him or them any book, record, document, or
paper which may be deemed material as evidence in the case.
Id.
89. Id. §§ 2, 10, 11.
90. Id. § 2.
91. Id. § 7.
92. Id. § 10.
93. See Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344 (1854) (involving an arbitration agreement
that was entered into after the dispute initially arose); Karthaus v. Yllas y Ferrer, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.)
222 (1828) (same).
94. See, e.g., Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445 (1874).
95. Id. at 451. "Every citizen is entitied to resort to all the courts of the country, and to invoke
the protection which all the laws or all those courts may afford him." Id.
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forced to overcome any historical hostility toward arbitration 96 and to
recognize the broad federal policy favoring arbitration.97 This shift in
judicial attitudes is clearly demonstrated by the change in the arbi-
trability of statutory claims, particularly those in the area of federal
securities law.
1. The Arbitrability of Federal Securities Disputes
The Supreme Court's initial brush with the arbitration of securities
claims occurred in Wilko v. Swan.98 In Wilko, the Court was con-
fronted with the issue of whether a dispute arising under section 12(2)
of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") 99 could be arbi-
trated.10 0 In concluding that such a claim could not be arbitrated, the
Court relied on section 14 of the Securities Act,'0' which provided
that any contract which required a waiver of the rights granted to par-
ties under the Securities Act was void. 02 The Court reasoned that the
Act created special rights for the protection of investors and, hence,
those rights, coupled with the strong public interest in the prompt and
economical resolution of controversies implicated by the Act, re-
quired vindication in a judicial forum.l0 3
The Court addressed a similar issue in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co.10 4 In Scherk, the plaintiff American company, Alberto-Culver,
sued Scherk, a German citizen, for violating section 10(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"). 10 5 While the
Court indicated that the controversy would likely be inarbitrable in
96. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1971). In this case, the Supreme
Court expressly rejected the longstanding notion that arbitration encroached upon judicial au-
thority, "The argument that such clauses are improper because they tend to 'oust' a court of
jurisdiction is hardly more than a vestigial legal fiction." Id. at 12.
97. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 474 (1989). "The Act was designed 'to overrule the judiciary's longstanding refusal to en-
force agreements to arbitrate' ... and place such agreements 'upon the same footing as other
contracts'...." Id. at 474 (citations omitted); see also McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351 (1st Cir.
1994) (holding that preferences in favor of arbitration are only applicable when parties have
formally agreed to such a resolution); Deloitte Noraduit A/S v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, U.S., 9
F.3d 1060 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that the FAA reflects congressional recognition of the benefits
of arbitration); Hartford Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. Teachworth, 898 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1990) (same);
Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., Ltd., 815 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1987) (same).
98. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
100. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 429-30.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 77n.
102. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
103. Id.
104. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
105. Id. at 509. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act (the "Exchange Act" ) is codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
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the domestic context under the Wilko rationale, the international set-
ting presented a different situation.106 Because the international con-
text "involve[d] considerations and policies significantly different
from those found controlling in Wilko,'' 1°7 the Court concluded that
the statutory policy of protecting investors and the public interest in
such protection was outweighed by international commercial con-
cerns.108 Hence, disputes under the Exchange Act could be arbitrated
if they occur in an international commercial setting and the balancing
of the competing interests involved favors arbitration.109
The international distinction lost considerable importance, how-
ever, following the Court's decision in Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon."0 In McMahon, the Court was faced with deciding
whether domestic claims arising under the Exchange Act and the
Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")" could
be arbitrated."12 The agreement between the parties contained a
broad arbitration clause covering "any controversy relating to the ac-
counts.""13 The Court ordered arbitration of the securities claims on
the theory that nothing in the legislative history, or in the Exchange
Act itself, indicated a congressional intention to "preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.""n4
The Court recognized that Scherk was limited to international com-
mercial transactions"15 but noted that "the competence of arbitral
tribunals to resolve § 10(b) claims is the same in both settings." 116
Additionally, the Court found no problem in ordering arbitration of
the RICO claims since nothing in RICO itself, or its legislative history,
indicated a congressional intent to preclude arbitration of such
claims.117 Interestingly, by comparing RICO claims to antitrust
claims," 8 including the treble damages provision present in both stat-
106. 417 U.S. at 515-20.
107. Id. at 515.
108. Id. at 519-20.
109. Id.; see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 630-
31 (1985) (demonstrating the later importance of the international commercial nature of the
dispute in the area of antitrust arbitration).
110. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
111. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
112. 482 U.S. at 222.
113. Id. at 223.
114. Id. at 227 (citations omitted).
115. Id. at 232.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 239-40.
118. At the time of the McMahon decision, the Court had already rendered its decision in
Mitsubishi, which had held that antitrust claims arising in the international commercial context
were arbitrable. See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing Mitsubishi and related cases).
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utory schemes, 1 9 the Court rejected the argument that RICO claims
were too complex for effective resolution through the arbitral
process. 120
Issues concerning the arbitrability of securities claims were most re-
cently addressed by the Court in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/
American Express, Inc.121 In Rodriguez de Quijas, the Court defini-
tively overruled Wilko v. Swan by holding that domestic claims under
section 12(2) of the Securities Act could be arbitrated. 22 Like McMa-
hon, the agreement in Rodriguez de Quijas included a broad arbitra-
tion clause applying to all controversies "relating to [the] accounts" of
the parties. 123 In ruling that the claim in Rodriguez de Quijas must be
submitted to arbitration pursuant to this broad contractual provision,
Justice Kennedy's opinion noted that the Court's decision in Wilko
was permeated by "the old judicial hostility to arbitration.' 24 This
hostility was clearly eroded by subsequent decisions. 125 Additionally,
the Securities Act does not specifically require a judicial forum, nor
does the policy of protecting purchasers of securities prevent the dis-
putes from being arbitrated. 126
The Court concluded that Wilko was "incorrectly decided and is in-
consistent with the prevailing uniform construction of other federal
statutes governing arbitration agreements in the setting of business
transactions."' 27 Following the Court's decision in Rodriguez de
Quijas, federal securities claims under either the Securities Act or the
Exchange Act could now be arbitrated. 128 As a result, the tension that
had previously existed between the Wilko and McMahon decisions
was seemingly removed. 29
119. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238-40. The treble damages provision of RICO does not specifi-
cally preclude arbitration. "[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial
and deterrent function." Id. at 240 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-
outh, 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).
120. Id. at 239.
121. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
122. Id. at 485.
123. Id. at 478.
124. Id. at 480 (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985
(2d Cir. 1942).
125. Id.; see, e.g., McMahon, 482 U.S. at 220; Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
126. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481.
127. Id. at 484.
128. Id. at 485.
129. Id. The Court removed the disparity by overruling Wilko.
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2. The Arbitrability of Other Federal Statutory Claims
A similar trend favoring the arbitrability of statutory claims has
gradually occurred in other areas as well. Claims under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (the "ADEA"),13° the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act (the "COGSA"),131 Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act ("Title VII"),132 and the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (the
"PMPA") 33 all have been subject to arbitration pursuant to contrac-
tual arbitration clauses. Additionally, patent claims, which were ini-
tially precluded from resolution through arbitration,34 have been
subsequently opened to arbitration via statute.' 35 The trend toward
the arbitrability of statutory claims is not surprising given that parties
seeking to preclude the arbitration of statutory claims have the formi-
dable burden of showing "that Congress intended to preclude a
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue. 1 36 As a
result of this trend, many commentators and courts have concluded
that domestic antitrust claims are proper subjects of arbitration. 137
II. THE EVOLUTION AND GOALS OF ANTITRUST LAW
Broadly speaking, the antitrust laws are designed to encourage free
and fair competition in the open market by restricting numerous
forms of anticompetitive and unfair conduct by market participants. 1
38
Both economic and noneconomic policies underlie the federal anti-
130. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982); see, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20, 26 (1991) (finding that absent a showing of congressional intent to preclude arbitration,
claims under the ADEA may be arbitrated pursuant to an arbitration agreement).
131. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1975); see, e.g., Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MV Sky
Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2330 (1995) (holding that the COGSA does not nullify foreign arbitra-
tion clauses contained in maritime bills of lading).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994); see, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299,
1305 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that Title VII claims may be arbitrated, but the Title VII plaintiff
must knowingly agree to submit such claims to arbitration).
133. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2805 (1982); see, e.g., Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244,
1247-48 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the submission of PMPA claims to arbitration could be
permissible provided that the dominant party does not compel the weaker party to surrender
statutorily mandated protections).
134. See, e.g., Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that the
validity of a patent is inappropriate for arbitration due to the public interest involved); Beckman
Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1970) (same).
135. 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1982).
136. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987) (citations omitted).
137. See Baker & Stabile, supra note 52, at 396 (arguing that, based on the Supreme Court's
willingness to enforce arbitration agreements even as to federal statutory claims, the arbitration
of domestic antitrust disputes is a current reality); see also Ngheim v. NEC Elecs., Inc. 25 F.3d
1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding domestic antitrust claims within the reach of contractual arbi-
tration clauses); Kowalski v. Chicago Tribune Co., 854 F.2d 168, 173 (7th Cir. 1988) (same).
138. See generally LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST (1977).
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trust laws.139 The antitrust laws are viewed by many as the guardians
of free competition and economic efficiency, both of which are key
components of a capitalistic market economy and a democratic
society.140
Modern antitrust law likely had its antecedents in early English
common law, which often rejected the validity of contracts in restraint
of trade.14' It was not until 1890 that Congress passed the Sherman
Act 142 in order to prohibit conspiracies (among more than one firm)
139. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY, AND
PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1994). The purely economic objectives of antitrust enforcement are exem-
plified by the so-called "Chicago School," which concerns itself primarily with the maximization
of economic efficiency, without serious regard to political or social considerations. Id. Maximiz-
ing economic efficiency theoretically maximizes overall societal wealth. Id. Under the "Chicago
School" rationale, the antitrust laws should be concerned with the protection of competition
rather than the protection of competitors. Id.
Conversely, the noneconomic policies underlying antitrust law are more concerned with
preventing undue concentration of economic power (the "Madisonian" theory) and the protec-
tion of small businesses from larger and more efficient firms (the "Jeffersonian" model). Id.
Competition is best promoted under these approaches by ensuring that a sufficient number of
competitors exist within a given market to prevent one, or a few, firms from becoming too pow-
erful and forcing small competitors out of the market. Id.; see STEPHEN F. Ross, PRINCIPLES OF
ANTITRUST LAW (1993).
In addition to the theories examined above, which Ross labels allocative efficiency (the "Chi-
cago School"), Ross, supra at 3-4, the "Jeffersonian" protection of small, independent busi-
nesses, id. at 6, and the "Madisonian" dispersion of economic power, id. at 8, there are additional
theories concerning the proper function of the antitrust laws. One such theory is concerned with
the protection of consumers from overreaching behavior by monopolists (one dominant seller in
a given market) and oligopolists (a few dominant sellers in a given market). Id at 5. It is argued
that monopolists or colluding oligopolists will seek to convert the "consumer surplus" (the
amount by which consumer satisfaction exceeds prices in a competitive market) to monopoly or
oligopoly profits by raising prices above the competitive level. Id. As a result, the former "con-
sumer surplus" will be transformed into monopoly or oligopoly profits. Id. This approach, la-
beled the "wealth transfer" theory, maintains that antitrust policy should seek to protect
consumers from exploitation by preventing monopolists or colluding oligopolists from creating a
"welfare loss" in the relevant market. Id.
For a more elaborate discussion of the noneconomic policies underlying antitrust laws, see
Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1979) (argu-
ing that the trend toward a purely economic approach to antitrust jurisprudence ignores the
important political concerns that are necessarily intertwined with many antitrust disputes).
140. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). "The Sherman Act...
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best
allocation of our economic resources .... while at the same time providing an environment
conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions." Id. at 4.
141. See Darcy v. Allein, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602) (voiding a patent monopoly in playing
cards granted by Queen Elizabeth to a courtier); Davenant v. Hurdis, 72 Eng. Rep. 769 (K.B.
1599) (first recorded case holding a monopoly to be illegal); see also William L. Letwin, The
English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 355 (1954) (offering a de-
tailed discussion and analysis of the English common law of restraints of trade). See generally
Donald Dewey, The Common-Law Background of Antitrust Policy, 41 VA. L. REV. 759 (1955).
142. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
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or conduct (by one firm) in restraint of trade.143 Referred to as "the
Magna Carta of free enterprise,"'144 the Sherman Act, despite its rela-
tively broad and ambiguous language, 45 accounts for a significant
number of antitrust claims.' 46 Other prominent antitrust statutes in-
clude the Clayton Act,' 47 the Robinson-Patman Act, 48 and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act (the "FTC Act"). 49
Antitrust disputes usually involve exceedingly complex issues. An-
titrust proceedings are fact-intensive endeavors, requiring detailed ev-
identiary findings and often involving complex market definition
inquiries, which necessitate expert testimony concerning intricate eco-
nomic theories.150 As a result of this inherent complexity, antitrust
litigation is frequently costly and time-consuming. 151 These difficul-
ties have increased substantially since the Supreme Court began shun-
143. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND
ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS (1994). The congressional debates surrounding the passage of the
Sherman Act expressed strong concern over market concentration, monopoly power, and cartel
formation. Id. at 3. It was feared that these types of behavior would inevitably lead to the
inefficient allocation of resources and higher prices for consumers. Id. Also, Congress was quite
concerned with protecting small businesses from the disastrous effects of trying to compete with
larger, more efficient rivals. Id. (citations omitted). Additional concerns of the 1890 Congress
included entrepreneurial independence, distributional effects, equitable considerations, and free-
dom of independent decision making and contracting. Id. at 2-3.
144. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
145. Senator Sherman himself, the sponsor of the legislation, recognized the lack of clear
guidelines provided by the statutory language. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 143, at 5.
Sherman noted that the "precise line between lawful and unlawful combinations.., must be left
for the courts to determine in each particular case." 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890) (remarks of
Sen. Sherman).
146. For a general discussion of the requirements for bringing actions under the various anti-
trust statutes, including the scope of claims brought under the Sherman Act, see SULLIVAN &
HARRISON, supra note 143, at 35-72.
147. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982). The Clayton Act generally prohibits certain exclusive dealing
arrangements, id. § 13(a), mergers that "substantially... lessen competition," id., and interlock-
ing directorates, id. § 19.
148. Id. §§ 13-13b, 21a. The Robinson-Patman Act generally prohibits price discrimination
involving like goods shipped in interstate commerce.
149. Id. §§ 41-46, 47-58. The FTC Act created the Federal Trade Commission to oversee cer-
tain aspects of trade practice and to challenge certain types of mergers, Id. § 45(a). The Act
expressly prohibits unfair methods of competition. Id. § 45(a)(1).
150. Baker & Stabile, supra note 52, at 396.
151. Id.
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ning the relatively quicker per se152 categorization analysis in favor of
the more searching, fact-intensive "rule of reason" analysis. 153
Antitrust suits may generally be commenced by governmental ac-
tors or private parties. 154 Both the Justice Department and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (the "FTC") are charged with the public
enforcement of the antitrust laws.155 However, the antitrust laws are
primarily enforced through lawsuits brought by private parties, largely
because of the treble damages remedy provided in section 4 of the
Clayton Act. 56 The treble damages remedy was created expressly for
the purpose of encouraging the active and liberal private enforcement
152. Per se rules in the antitrust context may be characterized as conclusive presumptions of
illegality that do not require elaborate evidentiary showings, intensive investigations, or complex
economic analysis. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 228 (1940). Such
rules apply to "agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that
no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality-they are 'illegal per se."'
National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
The policy justifications for the per se rules include: business certainty resulting from bright-
line rules clearly delineating what types of behavior will generate liability, judicial economy re-
sulting from quicker and less intensive litigation, and the lack of any redeeming virtues inherent
in the per se illegal conduct. Per se rules are currently restricted to price-fixing and horizontal
market exclusions. Multiflex, Inc. v. Samuel Moore & Co., 709 F.2d 980, 987 (5th Cir. 1983)
(citations omitted).
The Supreme Court's current trend toward shunning per se rules began in NCAA v. Board of
Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984), where the Court applied its rule-of-
reason analysis in determining whether the NCAA restraints placed on televised college football
broadcasts were unlawful horizontal restraints of trade. This trend has been recognized by lower
courts confronted with antitrust issues. See, e.g., Brant v. United States Polo Ass'n, 631 F. Supp.
71, 75 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (recognizing the Supreme Court's shunning of per se analysis in favor of
applying the rule-of-reason analysis).
153. Baker & Stabile, supra note 52, at 398 (citations omitted). Under the rule-of-reason
analysis, "[t]he true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition." Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
The competitive effects of such agreements are "evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the
business, the history of the restraint, and the reason why it was imposed." National Soc'y of
Profl Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692. By definition, the rule-of-reason analysis requires a reasoned,
detailed, and complex analysis of the possible anticompetitive effects and the possible procompe-
titive justifications of the challenged restraint. Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238. This necessarily
translates into greater delays and increased costs, although it does alleviate the problem of ap-
plying one arbitrary rule to every restraint that may fall within the per se realm.
154. See generally AREEDA, supra note 9, §§ 150-175 (noting the various methods of antitrust
enforcement).
155. Both agencies have concurrent jurisdiction over various sections of the Clayton and
Robinson-Patman Acts. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 143, at 35. Only the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Justice Department has jurisdiction over the Sherman Act, including the Act's crimi-
nal sanctions. Id. Of course, this discussion does not contemplate the numerous state antitrust
laws and their respective enforcement mechanisms.
156. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). Section 15(a) provides, in relevant part, that "any person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue ... and shall recover three-fold the damages ... sustained .... Id. § 15(a).
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of the antitrust laws. 157 Additionally, to further encourage private en-
forcement, a prior finding of liability in a governmental proceeding
may be used by private parties as prima facie evidence of the defend-
ant's liability in subsequent private lawsuits. 158 The treble damages
remedy has apparently had its desired effect, for it is estimated that
ninety percent of all antitrust suits are initiated by private parties. 159
The importance of the antitrust laws to the judiciary, and to society
as a whole, has often resulted in special considerations being. given to
difficult issues arising in the antitrust context. One such issue con-
cerns whether antitrust claims may, given the important underlying
public interests, be properly resolved through the private process of
commercial arbitration.
III. THE ARBITRABILITY OF ANTITRUST DISPUTES
A. American Safety and Its Progeny
The issue of whether domestic antitrust disputes could be arbitrated
was first addressed by the Second Circuit in its landmark opinion in
American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co. 160 American
Safety was the first time that a federal court of appeals gave a clear
indication that antitrust disputes were inarbitrable. 16' The case in-
volved a typical licensing agreement whereby the licensor granted the
licensee the rights to use its trademark. 162  The parties' licensing
157. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND ANTITRUST LAW § 14.1 (1985) (citations omit-
ted). However, the federal judiciary has attempted to set limits on private enforcement by en-
acting specific standing requirements, including the "antitrust injury" and "indirect purchaser"
rules. Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, various commentators have attacked the efficacy of
the treble damages remedy on numerous grounds. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 143,
§ 3.02. It is argued that the treble damages provision acts as an overdeterrent by giving antitrust
plaintiffs a windfall recovery, thereby removing any incentive to mitigate damages on the part of
the plaintiff. Id. § 3.07. Additionally, vague guidelines and the possibility of treble damages
liability may discourage aggressive competition by firms unable to discount the possibility of
potential liability. Id. Also, meritless antitrust claims may be filed more frequently in order to
elicit early and unfounded settlement offers from defendants unsure of their potential liability
but unwilling to take the chance of litigating and suffering a large award for treble damages. Id.
(citation omitted). Lastly, treble damages are criticized for overcompensating antitrust plaintiffs
and overpenalizing antitrust defendants. Id.
158. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a).
159. SULLIVAN & HARIuSON, supra note 143, § 3.02. It should be noted, however, that the
federal treble damages remedy can only be pursued in a United States District Court, and there
is no provision requiring such a remedy in state courts or private proceedings. Mitsubishi Mo-
tors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 654 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 822.
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agreement contained a broad arbitration clause.163 After the business
relationship soured, the licensee filed suit alleging that the licensing
agreement violated the Sherman Act and sought a declaratory judge-
ment stating that the agreement was illegal. 64 The licensor sought to
stay the litigation pending the outcome of arbitration. 65 The district
court granted the licensor's motion to stay the litigation and ordered
the parties to arbitrate the dispute, including the antitrust claims. 166
On appeal, the Second Circuit, relying on the reasoning of the
Supreme Court's decision in Wilko v. Swan,167 held that public policy
considerations require that antitrust disputes not be submitted to arbi-
tration. 168 The key inquiry, according to the Second Circuit, was
whether the statutory right in question was "of a character inappropri-
ate for enforcement by arbitration." 69 The fundamental policy con-
flict in this case concerned the tension between the "federal statutory
protection of a large segment of the public, frequently in an inferior
bargaining position, and [the] encouragement of arbitration."' 70
In resolving the conflict in favor of the inarbitrability of antitrust
claims, the Second Circuit espoused four key policy rationales sup-
porting its decision. First and foremost, the court recognized that anti-
trust claims implicate the strong national interest in a freely
competitive economy. 171 Because antitrust claims have such a wide-
ranging impact on the overall economic health of the public, the court
reasoned that it was unlikely that Congress intended to allow the non-
judicial resolution of such claims. 72 The second reason offered by the
court concerned the contractual relationship of the parties in an anti-
trust dispute. There is a strong possibility that one party in such a case
has superior bargaining power and can force the other party into a
163. The clause provided that "[a]ll controversies, disputes and claims of whatsoever nature
and description arising out of, or relating to, this Agreement and the performance thereof, shall




167. 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (holding that securities claims under the Securities Act were
inarbitrable in light of the public interests involved).
168. American Safety, 391 F.2d 821.
169. Id. at 825 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1953)).
170. Id. at 826.
171. Id. "The Sherman Act is designed to promote the national interest in a competitive
economy; thus, the plaintiff asserting his rights under the Act has been likened to a private
attorney-general who protects the public's interest." Id.
172. Id. at 827.
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contract of adhesion. 173 Hence, the stronger party, possibly a monop-
olist, could theoretically force the weaker party to involuntarily arbi-
trate any disputes that may arise.174
The third reason given by the Second Circuit concerned the com-
plexity of antitrust litigation. The court reasoned that complex eco-
nomic inquiries and detailed evidentiary showings were more suited to
the judicial forum, rather than the private arbitral forum. 175 The
fourth and final rationale relied on by the court concentrated on the
arbitrators themselves.1 76 Because commercial arbitrators are gener-
ally drawn from the business community, and it is the business com-
munity itself that is subject to regulation by the antitrust laws, the
court reasoned that there might be an inherent conflict of interest in
allowing the arbitration of antitrust claims by so-called "businessmen
arbitrators."177
Following the American Safety decision, the general prohibition on
the arbitration of antitrust disputes was applied by numerous courts
within the various federal circuits. 178 Not surprisingly, the Second Cir-
cuit's decision elicited a host of commentary, both pro and con. 179
173. Id. "[I]t is also proper to ask whether contracts of adhesion between alleged monopolists
and their customers should determine the forum for trying antitrust violations. Here again, we




177. Id. Although the court expressed no outright distrust of commercial arbitrators drawn
from the business community, the general implication may be that these arbitrators would be
inevitably biased against effective enforcement of the antitrust laws. Presumably, a conflict of
interest is inescapable for "businessmen arbitrators." The court fails, however, to explain why
judges are more suited to resolve complex commercial disputes than those engaged in commer-
cial transactions as part of their profession.
178. See Lake Communications, Inc. v. ICC Corp., 738 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1984) (recognizing
an implied exception to the FAA barring submission of antitrust claims to arbitration); Applied
Digital Tech., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1978) (affirming the district
court's decision to enjoin arbitration of antitrust issues); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir.
1974) (holding the plaintiff's antitrust claims inarbitrable); Helfenbein v. Int'l Indus., Inc., 438
F.2d 1068 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding that arbitrators have no jurisdiction to pass upon substantive
aspects of arbitration laws); Power Replacements, Inc. v. Air Preheater Co., 426 F.2d 980 (9th
Cir. 1970) (holding an agreement to arbitrate antitrust issues invalid); A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v.
Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding that antitrust is not an arbitrable issue);
Stendig Int'l, Inc. v. B. & B. Italia, S.p.A., 633 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding arbitration
of antitrust claims unenforceable).
179. See Lee Loevinger, Antitrust Issues as Subjects of Arbitration, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1085,
1089-90 (1969) (arguing that antitrust claims should not be subjects of arbitration because the
disadvantages of such an approach clearly outweigh the possible advantages of expediency, ex-
pertise, and economy). Among the twelve noted disadvantages of arbitration are:
(1) inappropriateness of antitrust issues to the scope of the conventional arbitration
clause;
(2) the complexity of antitrust determinations;
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Additionally, an exception to the general rule of inarbitrability for an-
titrust claims arose shortly thereafter in the Fifth Circuit.
In Cobb v. Lewis,180 the Fifth Circuit upheld the general policy of
inarbitrability as applied to antitrust claims, but recognized that agree-
ments to arbitrate antitrust disputes that were entered into after the
dispute had arisen were enforceable. 181 In reaching this conclusion,
(3) the lack of antitrust experience by the arbitrators;
(4) a restrained antitrust enforcement by businessmen arbitrators;
(5) a much weaker form of discovery in the arbitral setting;
(6) inconsistent results due to the lack of binding precedent in arbitration;
(7) arbitrators may give undue weight to non-legal defenses;
(8) contracts of adhesion may force the weaker party to arbitrate;
(9) contracts that contemplate antitrust violations are void as against public policy;
(10) the arbitration clause itself may be an invalid restraint;
(11) the finality of arbitration and its lack of review; and
(12) the public interest in antitrust disputes.
Id. at 1090-91. Loevinger concludes that antitrust claims should not be arbitrated due to the
inherent public policy ramifications and because such claims can easily be severed and evaluated
independently from other arbitrable issues. Id. at 1096; see also Robert Pitofsky, Arbitration and
Antitrust Enforcement, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1072, 1073-74 (1969) (arguing that the submission of
antitrust disputes to arbitration will have a deleterious effect on the public policy of encouraging
treble damages suits).
For a criticism of Loevinger's approach, see Gerald Aksen, Arbitration and Antitrust-Are
They Compatible?, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1097 (1969), arguing that antitrust disputes should be
submitted to arbitration. Aksen attempts to refute each of Loevinger's reasons for denying the
arbitrability of antitrust claims with the following twelve responses:
(1) parties may agree to arbitrate antitrust disputes for reasons of economy;
(2) it is relatively easy to obtain antitrust experts as arbitrators, and the judicial incon-
sistency in the area of antitrust militates against holding that the judicial forum is the
superior forum;
(3) like (2), antitrust experts may be obtained as arbitrators;
(4) "businessmen arbitrators" can be supplanted by legal experts;
(5) parties seeking arbitration are likely to be cooperative; also, the FAA gives arbi-
trators limited discovery powers under 9 U.S.C. § 7;
(6) antitrust arbitrators must be aware of the law in order to perform capably; also,
judicial reversal is allowed for arbitral awards which violate public policy;
(7) there is no evidence that nonlegal defenses will be given greater weight in the
arbitral forum;
(8) unequal bargaining power may be present in other commercial contracts where
arbitration clauses are enforced;
(9) arbitration clauses can survive a tainted contract; the clause is only voidable if it is
itself tainted;
(10) if the clause itself involves an illegal restraint, it is voidable;
(11) there is the possibility of nonbinding arbitration; and
(12) other disputes involving the public interest are arbitrable (i.e. labor).
Id. at 1098-1104. Aksen concludes that antitrust disputes should be subject to arbitration if: (1)
there is not a contract of adhesion; (2) the arbitration clause provides for "fair and equitable"
arbitration through the AAA; and (3) the arbitration agreement is not merely a ploy for circum-
venting the antitrust laws. Id. at 1110.
180. 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974).
181. Id. at 47.
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the court relied on dictum in American Safety leaving open the issue
of the enforceability of post-dispute agreements to arbitrate antitrust
disputes,182 as well as relying on several securities cases that upheld
similar post-dispute agreements to arbitrate. 183 However, the Cobb
court specifically noted that, in order to be enforceable, such agree-
ments must be expressly made and must refer specifically to the con-
troversy in question. t84 Such post-dispute agreements to arbitrate
cannot be found simply by virtue of the presence of an arbitration
clause in the original contract. 185 Notwithstanding the Cobb excep-
tion for post-dispute agreements to arbitrate, antitrust disputes gener-
ally remained inarbitrable until the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc.186
B. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
The American Safety doctrine continued as the general rule in this
area until the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Mitsubishi.1 87
In Mitsubishi, the dispute centered on the territorial restrictions in-
serted into a distribution agreement between a Puerto Rican automo-
bile dealership (Soler), a Japanese automobile manufacturer
(Mitsubishi), and Chrysler International, S.A. (CISA). 188 The agree-
ment provided Soler with the authority to sell Mitsubishi automobiles
within a designated geographic area.189 In addition, the agreement
contained a broad arbitration clause.' 90
When auto sales slumped in Puerto Rico due to an economic reces-
sion, Soler attempted to sell the autos outside of the contractually
specified area. 191 Mitsubishi protested and sought an order to compel
182. Id. (citing American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827 (2d
Cir. 1968) and Power Replacements, 426 F.2d at 984).
183. Id. at 47-48. The two securities decisions relied upon which the Cobb court relied were
Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 389 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1968) and Coenen v. R.W.
Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1972). In both cases, arbitration agreements were held
enforceable when made after the initial dispute had arisen.
184. Cobb, 488 F.2d at 48.
185. Id.
186. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 617.
189. Id.
190. Id. Paragraph VI of the Sales Agreement entitled "Arbitration of Certain Matters" pro-
vided that "[a]ll disputes, controversies, or differences which may arise ... shall be finally settled
by arbitration in Japan in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Japan Commercial
Arbitration Association." Id. (citation omitted).
191. Id. at 617-18.
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arbitration before the Japanese tribunal. 192 Soler counterclaimed on
the theory that Mitsubishi violated the Sherman Act by conspiring to
restrain trade. 193 Although the district court ordered arbitration of
the antitrust claims pursuant to the agreement between the parties, 194
the First Circuit reversed as to the antitrust claims, stating that anti-
trust disputes were inarbitrable under the American Safety doctrine. 195
The Supreme Court emphatically reversed the First Circuit, holding
that antitrust disputes arising in the international commercial context
may be arbitrated pursuant to a contractual arbitration clause. 196 Re-
lying on cases such as The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.197 and
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,198 the Court emphasized the importance
of the international commercial context and the need for dependabil-
ity and honesty in facilitating international trade.' 99 The federal pol-
icy favoring the enforcement of freely negotiated choice-of-forum
clauses,200 coupled with the strong federal policy favoring arbitration
as an alternative to litigation,20' required enforcing the clause at issue,
irrespective of the unique statutory nature of the dispute. 20 2
Although the Court could have relied solely on the international
character of the dispute for enforcement of the arbitration clause at
issue, it proceeded to address the merits of the American Safety doc-
trine as applied to the arbitration of antitrust issues in the interna-
tional commercial context.203 First, with respect to the Second
192. Id. at 619.
193. Id. at 619-20.
194. Id. at 620.
195. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155, 162-66 (1st Cir.
1983).
196. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 639-40.
197. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
198. 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974) (holding that although claims under the Exchange Act would
be inarbitrable in the domestic arena, the international commercial setting requires the submis-
sion of such disputes to arbitration).
199. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629. "[C]oncems of international comity, respect for the capaci-
ties of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international com-
mercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties'
agreement." Id. This is so despite the possibility that "a contrary result would be forthcoming in
a domestic context." Id.
200. Id. at 631 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1974)). "A parochial
refusal by courts of one country to enforce an international arbitration agreement would not
only frustrate these purposes, but would invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by
the parties to secure tactical litigation advantages." Id. Such actions would "damage the fabric
of international commerce and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of businessmen to
enter into international commercial agreements." Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 632. The Court expressed its "skepticism of certain aspects of the American Safety
doctrine." Id.
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Circuit's concern that antitrust disputes will often involve contracts of
adhesion, the Court noted that "[t]he mere appearance of an antitrust
dispute does not alone warrant invalidation of the selected forum on
the undemonstrated assumption that the arbitration clause is
tainted., 204 The Court reasoned that if the clause is truly tainted, then
the parties are free to attack its validity directly by arguing fraud, un-
due influence, or unequal bargaining power. 20 5
With respect to the Second Circuit's concern that the complexity of
antitrust claims renders them unsuitable for arbitration, the Court
noted that "[t]he anticipated subject matter of the dispute may be
taken into account when the arbitrators are appointed. '20 6 The Court
further reasoned that antitrust experts may easily be called upon to
serve as arbitrators in such a situation.207 Hence, as a result of the
Court's analysis, the complexity of antitrust issues would no longer
serve as a valid justification for denying arbitrability. 20 8
The Court expressly refused to consider as legitimate the Second
Circuit's concern regarding the possibility of inherent bias on the part
of arbitrators selected from the business community.20 9 Finally, the
Court recognized the importance of private enforcement, particularly
the treble damages remedy, to the effectiveness of the federal anti-
trust laws. 210 However, the Court concluded that the private treble
damages remedy could theoretically be sought in the international ar-
bitral forum. 211 Additionally, the Court reasoned that because parties
are not compelled to initiate an antitrust suit in the first place, there is
no reason why the parties cannot, at least in the international com-
mercial context, provide in advance for the arbitration of future anti-
trust disputes.21 2
The Mitsubishi decision did not expressly overrule the Second Cir-
cuit's holding in American Safety with respect to the arbitrability of
domestic antitrust disputes.213 However, although the Court found it
"unnecessary to assess the legitimacy of the American Safety doctrine
as applied to agreements to arbitrate arising from domestic transac-
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 633.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 633-34.
209. Id. at 634.
210. Id. at 635.
211. Id. "The importance of the private damages remedy, however, does not compel the con-
clusion that it may not be sought outside an American court." Id.
212. Id. at 636.
213. Id. at 638-39.
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tions, '214 the underlying rationale of that decision was substantially
undermined by the Court's criticism of the American Safety factors.215
Justice Stevens dissented from the holding in Mitsubishi, arguing
that arbitration is inappropriate in the antitrust context because of the
position which the antitrust laws occupy in American jurisprudence. 216
Because the antitrust laws occupy such an important position and im-
plicate strong public interests in free and fair competition, Justice Ste-
vens concluded that antitrust disputes are inappropriate for
arbitration.217 Additionally, the dissent pointed to the fact that treble
damages remedies may only be pursued in United States District
Courts.21 8 Since the treble damages scheme is a key enforcement
mechanism,21 9 Justice Stevens argued that its availability must be
guaranteed by the judiciary.220 In further support of his position, Jus-
tice Stevens noted that prior to the Court's decision in Mitsubishi, the
United States Courts of Appeals had been unanimous in holding anti-
trust claims inarbitrable 22' and that arbitral awards were subject only
to limited judicial review.222 Notwithstanding Justice Stevens'
thoughtful dissent, the majority decision in Mitsubishi set the stage for
a reversal of the judicial stance against the arbitrability of domestic
antitrust disputes.
C. The Post-Mitsubishi Trend Toward Arbitrability
Following the Mitsubishi decision, numerous lower courts began to
hold arbitration agreements enforceable as applied to domestic anti-
trust claims. 223 In Nghiem v. NEC Electronics, Inc. ,224 the Ninth Cir-
214. Id. at 629.
215. See supra notes 171-77 and accompanying text (discussing the American Safety factors).
216. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 652-54.
218. Id. at 654 (citing Blumenstock Bros. Adver. Agency v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 252 U.S. 436,
440 (1920)).
219. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
220. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 654.
221. Id. at 655.
222. Id. at 656.
223. See Coors Brewing Co. v. Molson Breweries, 51 F.3d 1511, 1515 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding
antitrust claims arbitrable if within the scope of the arbitration clause); Sanjuan v. American Bd.
of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 250 (7th Cir. 1994) (reasoning that agreements to
arbitrate domestic antitrust disputes are likely to be enforceable); Nghiem v. NEC Elecs., Inc.,
25 F.3d 1437, 1441-42 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that domestic antitrust claims may be arbi-
trated since the American Safety prohibition was no longer viable); Swensen's Ice Cream Co. v.
Corsair Corp., 942 F.2d 1307, 1310 (8th Cir. 1991) (recognizing the shift in the law in allowing
antitrust disputes to be arbitrated); Santa Cruz Med. Clinic v. Dominican Santa Cruz Hosp., No.
C93 20613, 1995 WL 232410, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 1995) (finding that arbitration of domes-
tic antitrust claims is allowable if the claims fall within the reach of the arbitration clause); Sys-
comm Int'l Corp. v. Synoptics Communications, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 135, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
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cuit, convinced that the Supreme Court's decision in Mitsubishi
overruled the American Safety rule of inarbitrability, held for the first
time that agreements to arbitrate domestic antitrust disputes were en-
forceable.22 5 The plaintiff in Nghiem sought to avoid the reach of an
arbitration clause following his termination as an employee of
NEC.2 26 The complaint, which included several different theories,
also contained an antitrust claim, which the plaintiff argued was in-
arbitrable. 227 In overruling its own precedent on this topic,228 the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the reasoning underlying American
Safety had been fatally undermined by the Supreme Court's decision
in Mitsubishi.229
The Nghiem court based its decision on several related factors.
First, the court noted that the Supreme Court had cited Mitsubishi in
subsequent cases in support of the proposition that antitrust disputes
may be arbitrated.230 Secondly, the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi spe-
cifically refuted the Second Circuit's reasoning in American Safety in
support of the inarbitrability of antitrust disputes. 231 Lastly, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that Mitsubishi represented the Supreme Court's in-
creasing desire to subject statutory claims to arbitration. 232 Based on
these considerations, the Nghiem court concluded that domestic anti-
trust disputes are subject to arbitration.233
A similar development occurred in the Tenth Circuit in Coors
Brewing Co. v. Molson Breweries.234 In Coors Brewing, the dispute
centered around a 1985 beer licensing agreement between Coors, a
Colorado company, and Molson, a Canadian company.235 The agree-
ment contained an arbitration clause which applied to "[a]ny dispute
arising in connection with the implementation, interpretation or en-
(holding arbitration of domestic antitrust disputes is allowable); Western Int'l Media Corp. v.
A.R. Johnson, 754 F. Supp. 871, 874 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (reading Mitsubishi as inferring that domes-
tic antitrust claims are likely to be arbitrable).
224. 25 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1994).
225. Id. at 1441.
226. Id. at 1439.
227. Id. at 1441.
228. Id. at 1441-42. The Ninth Circuit overruled its previous decision in Lake Communica-
tions, Inc. v. ICC Corp., 738 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1984), which held antitrust claims to be
inarbitrable.
229. Id. at 1442.
230. Id. at 1441.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1442.
233. Id.
234. 51 F.3d 1511 (10th Cir. 1995).
235. Id. at 1512.
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forcement of this Agreement. '236 After Molson entered into a part-
nership with Miller Brewing Company in 1993, while still bound under
the Coors licensing agreement,237 Coors filed suit. Coors alleged that
the Miller-Molson partnership was a combination in restraint of trade,
that Miller would have access to Coors' secret product and marketing
strategies, and that Miller would effectively control the marketing and
distribution of Coors' products in Canada.238
The Tenth Circuit recognized both the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration and the Mitsubishi holding that antitrust claims within the
scope of the contract may be arbitrated.239 The court's analysis fo-
cused specifically on whether the particular antitrust claim alleged by
Coors fell within the scope of the parties' agreement.240 In doing so,
the court reasoned that antitrust disputes fall within the scope of the
contract if the disputes "turned upon specific contractual provi-
sions. ' 241 Since issues concerning the secrecy of Coors' product and
marketing information were found to fall within the scope of the con-
tract, the court held that these issues were subject to the arbitration
clause.242
However, Coors' claims concerning undue market concentration
and likely anticompetitive effects stemming from the Miller-Molson
arrangement were found not to fall within the scope of the contract
largely because the parties contract could not be construed to apply to
Molson's arrangement with Miller, a third party.243 Because these
claims were not within the scope of the contract they were found to be
litigable, and not subject to mandatory arbitration pursuant to the
contractual arbitration clause.244 Hence, according to the Tenth Cir-
cuit's Coors Brewing decision, domestic antitrust claims that cannot
be interpreted as falling within the scope of the parties' contract are
not subject to the reach of a contractual arbitration clause.
D. Kotam Electronics-An Anomaly from the Past?
The general trend toward arbitrability in the antitrust context has
not been unanimous, however. Quite recently, the Eleventh Circuit,
236. Id. at 1513.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1514.
240. Id. at 1515.
241. Id.





in Kotam Electronics, Inc. v. JBL Consumer Products, Inc. ,245 ruled
that antitrust claims arising in the domestic context remained inarbi-
trable and reaffirmed the continuing validity of Cobb v. Lewis,246 in
which the Fifth Circuit specifically relied upon the American Safety
rationale in holding domestic antitrust disputes inarbitrable.247 The
dispute in Kotam concerned dealer and distributorship agreements be-
tween the parties.248 Each agreement contained a broad arbitration
clause.249 When the dispute arose, JBL sought to compel arbitration
on the theory that Mitsubishi overruled Cobb and thereby allowed the
arbitration of antitrust disputes. 250 However, the Eleventh Circuit re-
jected this argument in holding that pre-dispute agreements to arbi-
trate antitrust claims remain unenforceable.251
Because the Eleventh Circuit found Cobb to remain good law, it
noted that Mitsubishi should be properly confined to its context of
international commercial transactions. 252 Additionally, the court rea-
soned that nothing which occurred subsequent to Mitsubishi com-
pelled them to change this position.253 Furthermore, the court
concluded that the inherent conflict between effective antitrust en-
forcement and private arbitration mandated that antitrust disputes
continue to be inarbitrable in the domestic context.254 Consequently,
the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Kotam raises the question of
whether or not domestic antitrust disputes are definitively arbitrable
in light of the Supreme Court's decisions concerning the arbitrability
of statutory claims.
IV. ANALYSIS
This brief overview of the relevant precedent in the area of statu-
tory arbitration indicates a growing trend toward the arbitrability of
statutory disputes. Whether or not this trend will definitively encom-
pass domestic antitrust disputes remains to be seen. Nevertheless,
there remains an inherent and inescapable tension between the under-
lying policies of antitrust law and private arbitration. 255 Further, the
245. 59 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 1995).
246. 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974).
247. Id. at 47.
248. Kotam, 59 F.3d at 1156.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1159.
252. Id. at 1158.
253. Id.




possibility of having different standards of enforceability in the vari-
ous circuits or districts would not be conducive to business planning
and commercial relations. There is obviously a need for a uniform
standard within the federal judiciary regarding this issue, especially in
light of the growing globalization of the marketplace, in which parties
from widely divergent areas desire to enter into commercial relation-
ships governed by a single set of rules.
While some courts confronted with this issue have concluded that
the public interest will not be effectively vindicated through the pri-
vate arbitral process, 56 many other courts have taken the opposite
view, concluding that the underlying policies of antitrust law may the-
oretically be realized through arbitration.2 57 Despite the conflicting
approaches to this issue, it seems clear that the advantages of allowing
domestic antitrust claims to be arbitrated outweigh the possible disad-
vantages of such a procedure. However, in order to justify the sub-
mission of statutory claims implicating broad public interests to
arbitration, some degree of judicial supervision and a mechanism for
judicial review over arbitration decisions in this area is needed. Pro-
viding for some level of judicial supervision and for a substantive re-
view procedure may help to alleviate the legitimate concern that the
public interest in free competition will be subverted to private
concerns.
A. Rationales Supporting the Arbitrability of Domestic
Antitrust Disputes
Numerous legitimate reasons may be advanced in support of the
submission of domestic antitrust disputes to arbitration.2 58 First of all,
the benefits inherent to the arbitral process, including expediency, fi-
nality, and efficiency, are equally applicable to the antitrust context.2 59
Unlike litigation, which can last indefinitely and involve astronomical
expense, arbitration is specifically designed to render an expeditious
256. See, e.g., American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P, Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir.
1968) ("A claim under the antitrust laws is not merely a private matter. The Sherman Act is
designed to promote the national interest in a competitive economy; thus, the plaintiff asserting
his rights under the Act has been likened to a private attorney-general who protects the public's
interest.").
257. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635
(1985) (stating that "[t]he importance of the private damages remedy" does not compel the
conclusion that arbitration, at least in the international commercial context, is not an effective
forum in which to pursue such remedies).
258. See Aksen, supra note 179, at 1098-1104 (supplying twelve arguments in support of arbi-
trating antitrust claims); see also Allison, supra note 67, at 239-59 (refuting many of the underly-
ing assumptions and rationales supporting the inarbitrability of domestic antitrust disputes).
259. See KELLOR, supra note 2, at 4.
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decision involving the dispute at issue.260 The expense and delay of
conventional litigation is particularly evident in the antitrust area,
where complex evidentiary showings and seemingly endless discovery
are the norm.261 Clearly, a streamlined arbitration procedure should
prove advantageous in reducing the expense and delay of litigating
antitrust disputes. This rationale is particularly compelling in the cur-
rent commercial climate, in which globalization has placed a strong
emphasis on cost minimization in virtually all areas of business.
262
Secondly, arbitral awards are, practically, final and binding. The
FAA provides for judicial review only under very limited circum-
stances.263 However, in the rare instances where such review is
granted, it is generally limited to non-substantive issues.264 Hence,
parties to an arbitrated antitrust dispute can be relatively assured that
the decision of the arbitrator, or arbitrators, assuming that the proper
procedures are followed, will be final and binding and, unlike a judi-
cial determination, not subject to expensive and seemingly endless
appeals.
A third benefit associated with the arbitration of commercial dis-
putes allows for the parties to maintain a mutually beneficial level of
privacy concerning the dispute.265 Unlike judicial proceedings which,
at least in principle, are public in nature, arbitral proceedings are a
private matter between the parties. 266 Hence, the dissemination of de-
tailed accounts of unseemly anticompetitive conduct undertaken by
260. Id.
261. See Baker & Stabile, supra note 52, at 396 (noting that "[a]ntitrust litigation is notori-
ously fact-intensive, time-consuming, and expensive"); see also Allison, supra note 67, at 247
(noting the severe criticism by several key antitrust scholars, including Seventh Circuit Judges
Posner and Easterbrook, concerning the unduly lengthy and complex discovery process in anti-
trust suits). According to Judges Posner and Easterbrook, the antitrust discovery process runs
into "the millions of documents," making the pretrial process "interminable." Allison, supra
note 67, at 247 (citations omitted).
262. See KELLOR, supra note 2, at 3-4.
263. 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 10, 11 (1982).
264. Generally, judicial review of arbitration decisions is limited to instances where there is
misconduct on the part of the arbitrators, M&A Elec. Power Coop. v. Local Union No. 702,
International Bhd. of Elec- Workers, 773 F. Supp. 1259, 1262 (E.D. Mo. 1991), affd and re-
manded, 977 F.2d 1235, 1262 (8th Cir. 1992), where the decision reached is arbitrary and capri-
cious, see, e.g., Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939, 941 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding arbitrator's
failure to award statutorily mandated damages for state securites law violations was arbitrary
and capricious), where the award lacks fundamental rationality, see, e.g., Swift Indus., Inc. v.
Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1135 (3d Cir. 1972) (concluding that an arbitrator's award will
not stand if it lacks fundamental rationality), or where the arbitrators exceed their authority, see,
e.g., Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1256-57 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that an
arbitrator exceeded his authority by awarding damages for losses not actually suffered).
265. See KELLOR, supra note 2, at 14.
266. See Philip Rothman, Psst, Please Keep It Confidential-Arbitration Makes It Possible, 49
Disp. RESOL. J. 69 (1994).
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either party will remain confidential, thereby removing the danger of
adverse consumer reaction. Such a procedure may go far toward
maintaining goodwill, not only between the parties themselves but
also with respect to other business entities and the general public.
Business goodwill remains a valuable commodity in the commercial
community, especially in light of the increasing competitiveness inher-
ent in the global marketplace, in which reputation and goodwill are
becoming even more important as a means of distinguishing between
various producers on a non-cost basis.267
Additionally, because the concept of business goodwill is an intangi-
ble quality, it does not lend itself to precise determinations of value.268
Hence, efforts to quantify compensatory damages in the judicial fo-
rum for a reduction in one party's business goodwill prove exceed-
ingly difficult. Since damages for this component are difficult to
calculate, it is obviously preferable for the offending party to keep
antitrust proceedings, with their negative connotations, as confidential
as possible. As a result, the arbitration alternative, with its accompa-
nying confidentiality, is further strengthened as a reason to avoid con-
ventional litigation.
Fourth, much of the Second Circuit's reasoning supporting its deci-
sion in American Safety has been subsequently undermined by the
Supreme Court's decisions in Mitsubishi,269 McMahon,270 and Rodri-
guez de Quijas.271 Following Mitsubishi, it seems clear that arguments
against arbitration focusing on either the inherent complexity of anti-
trust litigation, invalidity of the contractual arbitration provision due
to unequal bargaining power, or possible bias on the part of the arbi-
trators will not be seriously entertained by a reviewing court. In re-
moving barriers to the arbitrability of domestic securities disputes,
both McMahon272 and Rodriguez de Quija 273 indicate a growing will-
267. Well Ceramics & Glass v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700, 709-11 (D.N.J. 1985) (discussing the
concept of goodwill in the trademark context and its value in different markets). For a more
detailed discussion of the goodwill concept, see Lynda J. Oswald, Goodwill and Going-Concern
Value: Emerging Factors in the Just Compensation Equation, 32 B.C. L. REv. 283 (1991).
268. See Toltec Fabrics, Inc. v. August, Inc., 29 F.3d 778, 781 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that
allegations of damages for lost goodwill require the plaintiff to establish an actual loss of good-
will, to send objective evidence as to the amount of the loss, and to show that the loss was caused
by the defendant); Fonar Corp. v. Deccaid Servs., Inc., 787 F. Supp. 44, 48 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(concluding that since damages for goodwill are not subject to ready calculation, they support a
finding of irreparable injury for purposes of a preliminary injunction).
269. See supra notes 187-215 and accompanying text (discussing the Mitsubishi decision).
270. See supra notes 110-20 and accompanying text (discussing the McMahon decision).
271. See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text (discussing the Rodriguez de Quijas
decision).
272. 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987).
273. 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989).
[Vol. 46:779
1997] ANTITRUST ARBITRATION 811
ingness by the Court to submit statutory disputes to an arbitral forum
absent a clear indication that such disputes were intended by the legis-
lature to be resolved solely in a judicial forum. 274 As a result of recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area, it may well be that the only
justification retaining its validity concerns the vindication of the public
interests underlying the federal antitrust laws, including free and fair
competition and the need for private enforcement and deterrence. 275
A fifth reason supporting the submission of domestic antitrust dis-
putes to arbitration concerns the disparity created by Cobb.276 Cobb
held that agreements to arbitrate domestic antitrust disputes were en-
forceable if the parties voluntarily entered into such agreements after
the dispute had arisen.2 77 The Cobb court reasoned that permitting
post-dispute agreements to arbitrate domestic antitrust disputes did
not implicate public policy concerns in the same sense that pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate did.278 Apparently, the court believed that
because the parties had voluntarily agreed to participate in the arbi-
tral forum with full knowledge of the risks and, presumably, had full
awareness of the underlying policy concerns, it was less likely that the
public interest would be subverted to purely private concerns.
Although the Cobb holding gave judicial effect to the parties' inten-
tions in resolving their contractual dispute, the court failed to ade-
quately explain how the public interests underlying antitrust disputes
could be better realized if the arbitration agreement occurred post-
dispute, rather than pre-dispute. 279 As a matter of antitrust policy,
274. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text (noting the Supreme Court's requirement
that a party seeking to avoid the submission of a statutory claim to arbitration must clearly show
a congressional intention to preclude arbitration of the claim at issue).
275. Indeed, at least two commentators agree that this argument is one of the few remaining
arguments supporting inarbitrability that continues to be valid. See Allison, supra note 67, at 275
("The one rationale that best endures challenge is that incentives for private enforcement are
likely to be reduced if antitrust claims are treated as arbitrable under future-disputes clauses.");
Lee, supra note 28, at 3-4 (noting that the only supporting argument from American Safety that
is not a "makeweight" concerns the reduced deterrent effect of antitrust law if antitrust disputes
are submitted to arbitration).
276. Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that agreements to arbitrate
antitrust disputes entered into after the dispute had arisen were enforceable).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Indeed, one would assume that the underlying public interests in free and unfettered
competition remain the same whether an arbitration agreement occurs pre-dispute or post-dis-
pute. It is unclear why the court arrived at this conclusion, but this decision was arguably a
precursor to the Supreme Court's decision in Mitsubishi, holding international agreements to
arbitrate antitrust disputes enforceable.
It remains unclear how the Supreme Court would rule today on the precise issue of whether
domestic antitrust disputes may be arbitrated via a broad pre-dispute contractual arbitration
clause. One can only hypothesize that given the Court's willingness to find statutory disputes
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this decision creates an odd doctrinal distinction between pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate, which may be unenforceable, and post-dis-
pute arbitration agreements, which are enforceable.
It is arguable that if post-dispute agreements are enforceable, then
pre-dispute agreements should also be enforceable since the underly-
ing public policies are presumably identical. However, one can argue
just as forcefully that the parties entering into a post-dispute arbitra-
tion agreement were cognizant of the policy implications and deliber-
ately chose to resolve the dispute in the more convenient arbitral
forum. Hence, they may take steps to ensure that the underlying poli-
cies will be effectively vindicated through the arbitral process by
choosing competent arbitrators who are experienced in the field of
antitrust enforcement and are willing to faithfully apply relevant laws
and precedents to the dispute at hand. Further, the parties may spe-
cifically provide for the possibility of a treble damages remedy in the
event that a violation is found to have occurred.
Conversely, parties entering into a pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ment cannot predict with any degree of certainty whether antitrust
disputes will arise under the parties' contract. As a result, they cannot
deliberately and voluntarily choose to vindicate those disputes
through the arbitral forum. Indeed, they may be forced to arbitrate
antitrust disputes that they would otherwise prefer to litigate. In a
situation like this, it is unlikely that the party forced into arbitration
will be overly concerned with the public policy implications of the un-
derlying dispute.
The final rationale supporting the submission of domestic antitrust
disputes to arbitration280 is the growing judicial trend permitting statu-
tory disputes to be arbitrated. Both McMahon281 and Rodriguez de
Quijas282 indicate a broad willingness on the part of the Supreme
Court to order the arbitration of statutory issues.2 83 Interestingly, the
arbitrable, especially in the context of the federal securities laws and the RICO statute, the
Court would hold domestic antitrust disputes to be arbitrable. However, this does not address
the question of how to ensure that the underlying public interests are effectively vindicated
through such a process.
280. See supra notes 98-129 and accompanying text.
281. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238, 242 (1987) (finding that
claims under the Exchange Act and RICO arbitrable).
282. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989) (holding
that claims under the Securities Act were arbitrable).
283. Both McMahon and Rodriguez de Quijas resulted in previously inarbitrable disputes
under the federal securities laws becoming appropriate subjects of arbitration. Much like the
federal antitrust laws, the federal securities laws, under both the Securities Act and the Ex-
change Act, implicate strong underlying public policies. The Acts were passed in the aftermath
of the 1929 stock market crash leading to the Great Depression. Both Acts are designed to
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Court in McMahon analogized RICO claims to antitrust claims2 84 and
specifically noted the comparable treble damages remedy present in
both statutory schemes.285 The McMahon Court specifically held
RICO claims to be arbitrable. 286 The McMahon decision strongly in-
dicates that the Court would be likely to find domestic antitrust dis-
putes subject to the reach of broad contractual arbitration clauses if
directly confronted with the issue.
Following the course of the above analysis, it is clear that several
valid and persuasive arguments can be made -in support of permitting
the arbitration of domestic antitrust disputes. The expediency, cost-
effectiveness, and finality of arbitration, the notion of privacy and the
protection of business goodwill, the seemingly odd distinction of al-
lowing post-dispute agreements to arbitrate antitrust claims, the ana-
lytical position of the Supreme Court in analogous situations, and the
growing trend allowing the arbitration of statutory claims all tend to
support the arbitrability of domestic antitrust disputes.
B. Rationales Opposing the Arbitrability of Domestic
Antitrust Disputes
Just as there are numerous rationales advanced in support of sub-
mitting domestic antitrust disputes to arbitration, there are also a
number of arguments opposing such a result. First and foremost, the
most compelling, yet the most quantitatively difficult, argument con-
cerns the underlying public interests implicated by the federal anti-
trust laws.287 The public interest in free and unfettered competition in
the marketplace is no less important in today's economic climate than
it was in 1968, when the Second Circuit rendered its decision in Amer-
encourage full and honest disclosure of all relevant financial information to potential investors
so that the investing public can make informed and intelligent investment decisions. See, e.g.,
Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946) (recognizing the pur-
pose of the Securities Act as compelling "full and fair disclosure" with respect to the various
types of investment securities). One can hypothesize that the policy of protecting the investing
public by requiring full and fair disclosure is equally as important as the public policy of ensuring
free and unfettered competition, which underlies the federal antitrust laws. If, in fact, this is
true, and disputes under the securities acts may be arbitrated without fear of subrogating the
policies underlying those laws, then it would seem disingenuous to prohibit the arbitration of
antitrust disputes.
284. 482 U.S. at 240.
285. Id. Both the civil portion of RICO, 18 U.S.C § 1964(c) (1994), and the federal antitrust
laws, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994), provide for a treble damages remedy. Presumably, the purpose of
providing such a remedy is to encourage the private enforcement of the relevant portions of each
statutory scheme.
286. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
287. Baker & Stabile, supra note 52, at 396.
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ican Safety.2 88 Indeed, with the advent of the global economy and the
growing trend toward free international trade, these interests may be
even more compelling today.2 89 Although the current Supreme Court
has been reluctant to pursue vigorous enforcement of the antitrust
laws, the federal antitrust regulatory scheme, despite some of its ana-
lytical drawbacks, 290 remains an important guarantor of free and fair
competition.
It is quite possible that private enforcement of the antitrust laws will
result in the underlying policies being subrogated to private inter-
ests.291 The policies most likely to be adversely affected include the
treble damages remedy and the deterrent function of the antitrust
laws. The treble damages remedy not only encourages private en-
forcement of the antitrust laws, but it also acts as a deterrent to poten-
tial violators who must account for the possibility of large damages
awards.292 A loosening of the treble damages requirement, so the ar-
gument goes, will necessarily lead to reduced deterrence.
There is little doubt that the possibility of recovering treble dam-
ages remains an important incentive for private plaintiffs to pursue
288. See id. at 403 (noting that the antitrust laws promote the national interest in a competi-
tive economy) (citation omitted).
289. For an excellent discussion and analysis of the growing trend toward globalization and
the international economy, including its potential impact on American workers and industries,
see ROBERT REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS (1991).
290. These drawbacks are particularly evident in the area of health care. For example, the
FTC has been severely criticized for its policies and the analytical framework it applies to evalu-
ating the legality of hospital mergers. See Hearings on Global and Innovation-Based Competi-
tion Before the Federal Trade Comm'n, Nov. 14, 1995 (noting that hospital merger analysis
requires a new analytical framework which takes into account specific market structures, realistic
geographic market boundaries based on expanding HMO services, and the status of nonprofit
hospitals) (remarks of Joe Sims, of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue); Hearings on Global and Inno-
vation-Based Competition Before the Federal Trade Comm'n, Nov. 17, 1995 (market concentra-
tion is an improper basis upon which to assess competition in health care markets since increased
concentration in these markets is associated with greater efficiency rather than a tendency to
collude) (remarks of Richard L. Scott, President and CEO of Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corp.).
The FTC analyzes hospital markets much like it does any other market, trying to ensure com-
petition through requiring numerous competitors and preventing market concentration levels
from becoming unduly large. However, because hospital markets tend to be more efficient and
less wasteful as they become more concentrated, largely because fewer hospitals tends to lead to
fewer redundancies in the services provided, this analysis tends to perpetuate inefficiency in the
health care marketplace. For a more intensive analysis of antitrust policy as it relates to health
care, see David L. Meyer & Charles F. Rule, Health Care Collaboration Does Not Require Sub-
stantive Antitrust Reform, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169, 171 (1994) (arguing that current anti-
trust policy can be effectively adapted to the unique structure of modem health care markets).
291. See Loevinger, supra note 179, at 1091 (arguing that the public interest in antitrust dis-
putes cannot be effectively realized in the arbitral forum); Pitofsky, supra note 179, at 1072
(arguing that arbitration will cripple the policy of encouraging treble damages actions).
292. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
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antitrust claims against offending parties. Because arbitration is
designed primarily to reach a fair settlement or compromise between
the parties, arbitrators are more likely to award only actual damages
rather than the statutorily mandated treble damages.2 93 As a result,
private plaintiffs would no longer have as strong an incentive to pur-
sue antitrust claims when faced with a broad arbitration clause. Fur-
thermore, potential antitrust violators are no longer as effectively
deterred in the absence of clear treble damages liability.294 Conse-
quently, both enforcement and deterrence would be necessarily di-
minished by permitting arbitration of domestic antitrust disputes.
One must question whether such a result is consistent with the con-
gressional purposes and public policies underlying the federal anti-
trust laws.
In further support of this argument, Justice Stevens, in his Mitsub-
ishi dissent, noted that an antitrust action for treble damages may only
be pursued in a United States District Court.295 Although this proce-
dural requirement may not necessarily preclude the award of treble
damages in the arbitral forum, it effectively neutralizes any contention
that an arbitrator may be compelled to award treble damages to the
successful antitrust plaintiff.296 Further, this result permits the award
of a statutorily mandated remedy to become merely discretionary. As
a result, some of the "teeth" are being pulled out of effective antitrust
enforcement.
Additionally, an arbitrator's chief function is to render a fair solu-
tion or a compromise to a present dispute.297 This effectively removes
the notion of deterrence from the scope of the arbitrator's authority.
As a result, the sophisticated antitrust violator has an incentive to con-
tractually bind any potential plaintiffs to broad arbitration clauses
under which the violator can compel arbitration. The only way to cir-
cumvent the reach of an arbitration clause is to attack its validity di-
rectly, rather than the validity of the contract as a whole, 298 and
293. See Lee, supra note 28, at 4. Lee notes that the only "real" argument supporting the
inarbitrability of antitrust claims concerns the reduced deterrence that would occur as a result of
submitting such claims to arbitration. Id. This reduced deterrence occurs because potential vio-
lators will no longer be concerned about the possibility of treble damages if they can contractu-
ally compel the other party to arbitrate any antitrust claims that could conceivably arise. Id.
294. Id.
295. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 654 (1985) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
296. Id.
297. See DOMKE, supra note 32, §§ 20.00-21.04.
298. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 632. "A party resisting arbitration of course may attack directly
the validity of the agreement to arbitrate." Id. (citation omitted). A showing required to set
aside the arbitration clause includes fraud, undue influence, or unequal bargaining power. Id.
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parties may find themselves bound to arbitrate despite lacking any
intention to do so. Under this scenario, the antitrust violator would
clearly prefer the "fairness" of arbitration to the uncertainties of con-
ventional litigation.
A second argument against the submission of domestic antitrust dis-
putes to arbitration is the lack of substantive review of arbitral deci-
sions.299 The lack of meaningful judicial review over the substantive
aspects of arbitral awards creates a legitimate concern over possible
abuses and mistakes of law.300 Because there is generally no mecha-
nism for substantive review of the arbitral award, 301 and there is usu-
ally no written record of the arbitral proceedings, there is no method
of guaranteeing that the principles underlying antitrust law will be
faithfully applied.302 Indeed, an arbitrator may not even be required
to apply relevant antitrust principles and precedents.
Obviously, the benefits of expediency and relative simplicity associ-
ated with arbitration are directly related to the fact that arbitrators are
not bound to rigorously apply the applicable legal framework. How-
ever, while the elimination of searching judicial inquiries and restric-
tive procedural guidelines may be attractive to some, this does little to
guarantee application of antitrust principles. In the area of antitrust,
application of the applicable laws and remedies, or at least the princi-
ples underlying such laws, is essential to the vindication of the under-
lying policies. At least one commentator has suggested that antitrust
arbitrators are duty-bound to apply "at least ... the general spirit of
antitrust rules" in order to be faithful to their function.30 3 However,
without a meaningful method of substantive judicial review, it is ques-
tionable whether relying on each individual arbitrator's sense of
"duty" provides sufficient protection for antitrust policy.
Certainly, placing blind reliance on the discretion of individual arbi-
trators recalls the concern of the Second Circuit in American Safety
(citation omitted). However, this showing must apply directly to the arbitration clause itself.
Attacks on the contract as a whole are subject to arbitration under the reach of the clause. This
is a tenuous distinction at best.
299. Allison, supra note 67, at 240.
300. Id. at 240-41.
301. See Gingiss Int'l, Inc. v. Bonnet, 58 F.3d 328, 333 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that factual or
legal errors, even if gross or clear, do not authorize a court to overturn arbitral awards); Ains-
worth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939, 940 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that courts are generally prohibited
from vacating arbitral awards based on errors of law or interpretation); Office of Supply, Gov't
of Republic of Korea v. New York Navigation Co., Inc., 469 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1972) (finding
that arbitral awards will not be set aside based on errors of law or interpretation of law).
302. Allison, supra note 67, at 240.
303. Id. at 243.
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regarding the neutrality of the so-called "businessmen arbitrators. '304
It may well be that the vast majority of commercial arbitrators have
no bias against the antitrust laws. However, the possibility of bias
should not be overlooked given the immense authority vested in the
arbitrators and the lack of meaningful substantive review measures
over the decisions of arbitrators.30 5 To refuse to address this possibil-
ity is to effectively ignore, and perhaps condone, abuse of the arbitral
process.
The difficulties associated with the lack of substantive review meas-
ures may be compounded by the subpar process of evidentiary pro-
duction in the arbitral setting.306 Because the arbitral forum generally
has no definitive discovery process, the production of evidence is gen-
erally left to the discretion of the arbitrator, who may or may not
choose to exercise his or her subpoena power. 30 7 This power may
prove sufficient in a standard, two-party case, but it presents difficul-
ties if the antitrust dispute involves third parties not subject to the
arbitrator's subpoena power.308 It may prove virtually impossible to
compel third parties unrelated to the proceeding to furnish the arbi-
tral tribunal with evidentiary materials. 30 9 Clearly, if material evi-
dence is in the possession of uncooperative third parties, as it often is
in complex antitrust cases involving allegations of conspiracy or price-
fixing, the judicial forum, with its superior subpoena powers and its
effective contempt powers, is preferable to the arbitral forum.
Arguments concerning the complexity of antitrust issues are clearly
no longer viable in light of Mitsubishi. It seems obvious that disputing
parties are free to retain antitrust experts or law professors as arbitra-
tors. Indeed, such experts are probably far superior to the average
judge presiding over complex antitrust cases who is generally not an
antitrust or economics scholar.310 Additionally, if the courts are will-
304. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (noting the inherent conflict of interest when
commercial arbitrators are drawn from the business community).
305. Indeed, it is an elementary principle of the law of evidence that bias on the part of a
witness is always relevant, and is always a proper inquiry. One must wonder why the notion of
bias is not as equally relevant in the context of commercial arbitration, which generally lacks the
substantive review measures and appeals process associated with a trial court's evidentiary
conclusions.
306. Allison, supra note 67, at 246-48.
307. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing the arbitrator's token subpoena
power granted pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1982)).
308. Baker & Stabile, supra note 52, at 410.
309. See id. The authors note that this barrier to effective resolution may prove to be "virtu-
ally insuperable" in antitrust disputes involving allegations of conspiracy. Id.
310. Of course, excepted from this broad generalization are recognized judicial antitrust and
economics scholars such as Seventh Circuit Judges Posner and Easterbrook.
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ing to submit complex antitrust issues to juries for resolution, what
possible justification exists for refusing to submit those same disputes
to commercial arbitrators, who are generally more experienced and
insightful than the average juror?
As can be seen from this brief overview of the arguments support-
ing inarbitrability, real concerns exist which could serve as a valid ba-
sis for precluding the submission of domestic antitrust disputes to
arbitration. The problem arises when one attempts to balance these
concerns with the equally compelling arguments favoring the submis-
sion of domestic antitrust disputes to arbitration. Clearly, there must
be a workable solution which would permit parties to take advantage
of the numerous benefits associated with arbitration, while also pro-
tecting the broader public interests in effective antitrust enforcement.
C. Is There a Logical Solution?
At one extreme, all antitrust disputes can be submitted to arbitra-
tion without any type of restrictions or safeguards. Allowing a broad
rule of arbitrability permits the parties to take advantage of the bene-
fits of arbitration but ignores the dangers presented to the underlying
public interests in such disputes. At the other end of the spectrum, a
broad prohibition against the arbitration of any antitrust disputes may
be adopted. 311 While this alternative effectively protects the underly-
ing policies, it prevents the parties from enjoying the benefits of arbi-
tration and forces them to undertake litigation. It seems apparent
that neither of these alternatives offers the best accommodation be-
tween the parties' interests and the vindication of public policies.
1. The Scope-of-the- Contract Rationale
A scope-of-the-contract rationale may offer a compromise position
under which the parties may arbitrate only those antitrust disputes
which fall within the scope of their contract. Certainly, a strong argu-
ment can be made that the scope-of-the-contract rationale is the most
effective and logical solution. Clearly, if arbitration is truly a function
of contract, then only those disputes falling within the scope of the
contract itself should be subject to the reach of the arbitration clause.
Given that the arbitration clause will be interpreted broadly by courts
compelled to apply the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, with
any uncertainty being resolved in favor of arbitration, the scope of the
contract may prove to be rather broad. Of course, the parties always
311. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (indicating a line of cases that followed the
general prohibition on the arbitration of antitrust disputes).
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remain free to enter into post-dispute agreements to arbitrate anti-
trust disputes under the Cobb rationale.312
Following the scope-of-the-contract rationale generally gives legal
effect to the intentions of the parties. Contracting parties, at least the-
oretically, through the drafting process, have complete control over
the proper reach of the arbitration clause.313 They may draft the
clause as broadly, or as narrowly, as possible. By phrasing the clause
so as to expressly include or exclude specific disputes, the parties will
be placed on notice beforehand as to which disputes will be subject to
arbitration. 314 Most importantly, the parties remain free to exclude
antitrust issues from the scope of the arbitration clause by expressly
drafting such an exclusion.315
It is well settled that arbitration cannot be compelled unless there is
an express agreement to do so. 316 Hence, if a dispute is expressly ex-
cluded from arbitration by virtue of proper drafting, it cannot be com-
pelled to undergo arbitration, unless of course the parties agree to do
so after the fact.317 As a result, the true intentions of the parties will
be preserved if the parties take sufficient time and observe the proper
care during the drafting process. Of course, the dangers of dispropor-
tionate bargaining power and overreaching are always present in the
area of commercial contracting. Given the Supreme Court's clearly
articulated stance on this issue,318 the party alleging an abuse of
power must attack the validity of the arbitration clause directly, rather
than attacking the validity of the contract as a whole, in order to avoid
arbitration on these grounds. Nevertheless, the mere possibility of un-
equal bargaining power should not serve as a bar to arbitration.
Notwithstanding the benefits of a scope-of-the-contract approach,
there are a few relevant criticisms which must be addressed. Courts
often fail to pay attention to the notion of contractual intent in ad-
dressing the arbitrability of antitrust issues.319 Many courts simply as-
sume that the parties intended the arbitration clause at issue to extend
to any dispute arising under the parties' contract, including antitrust
312. See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Cobb decision).
313. Baker & Stabile, supra note 52, at 420.
314. Id. at 423.
315. Of course, the key to successful construction of an arbitration clause rests within the
foresight and the semantic abilities of the drafter. For an excellent discussion of the issues facing
corporate counsel when drafting such agreements, see id.
316. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 48.49 and accompanying text.
318. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 632
(1985).
319. Allison, supra note 67, at 239.
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claims. 320 Part of the reason for the failure of many courts to address
effectively the notion of the parties' intent is due to the fact that most
arbitration clauses are phrased in relatively broad and inclusive lan-
guage, thereby making a subsequent judicial determination of the par-
ties' true intent all the more difficult.321 Additionally, because of the
generalized language employed in arbitration clauses, they are inter-
preted quite broadly and often applied even to disputes with indirect,
tangential relationships to the contract itself.322
In spite of these legitimate criticisms, however, the scope-of-the-
contract rationale seems to be the one approach that is most faithful
to the well-established notion that arbitration is a creature of contract.
Not surprisingly, every one of the above-mentioned concerns could be
entirely circumvented through proper drafting with an eye toward the
possibility of future antitrust disputes. Thus, the burden would be
placed on the parties' entering into a contract containing an arbitra-
tion clause to draft the clause so that it specifically conforms with their
respective intentions. In the absence of fraud, undue influence, or
overreaching, a court confronted with such a clause, which clearly em-
bodies the intentions of the parties, will be required to enforce it as
written.323 Hence, the parties are given the power to control whether
certain disputes will be subject to arbitration or, instead, will be re-
solved solely through litigation.
2.. Vindication of the Public Interests Underlying Antitrust Disputes
While the scope-of-the-contract rationale is an analytically prefera-
ble method for determining whether antitrust disputes should be arbi-
trated, it fails to adequately address the danger that the public interest
will be subverted to private concerns in the arbitral forum. Obviously,
the parties have the power to contract out of arbitrating antitrust dis-
putes. Once an arbitration clause is found to reach an antitrust dis-
pute falling within the scope of the parties' contract, however, it must
be arbitrated. Hence, an effective means must be devised for ensuring
that the underlying public interests are effectively realized. To this
end, it is desirable to preserve both the treble damages remedy and its
deterrent effect in the arbitral forum. However, this procedure must




322. Id. at 240.
323. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 632.
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The preservation of the underlying public policies could be effec-
tively assured through a process of limited judicial supervision and
review over arbitral proceedings involving complex antitrust issues. 324
By ensuring that antitrust arbitrators apply at least the general princi-
ples underlying antitrust law, including the rules embodied in key
precedents applicable to the dispute at issue and the treble damages
remedy, the underlying public interests, particularly those of private
enforcement and deterrence, may be given their full effect. Clearly,
judicial supervision should not be required at every step of the arbitra-
tion process. This would serve only to tax an already overburdened
federal judiciary and needlessly increase the cost of arbitration pro-
ceedings. Instead, judicial supervision should be required only over
certain key areas of the arbitration process.
For instance, judicial supervision may be required in order to ensure
that unbiased, expert arbitrators are selected by the parties. This is
necessary to ensure that the arbitrators have an antitrust background,
including an appreciation of the economic principles relevant to anti-
trust analysis, and that they can appreciate the broad public interests
implicated by the dispute at hand.32 5 Further, the judiciary may need
to ensure that relevant legal principles and rules are applied in a man-
ner faithful to the proper enforcement of the antitrust laws.326 This
may be accomplished by requiring a brief written record of the arbi-
tral proceedings, which is composed primarily of the decision of the
arbitrators and includes the relevant facts, the legal standards applied
to those facts, and any public policy considerations that played a role
in the final decision. Requiring a written record, however brief, al-
lows a court to review the substance of the arbitration decision with-
out being required to effectively rehear the entire case.
Additionally, courts must be given the power to vacate arbitral
awards that fail to follow the applicable legal principles or violate pub-
lic policy. Although the FAA does permit a court to vacate an arbitral
award that clearly violates public policy,327 the vacation of awards
under this provision are exceedingly rare and difficult to secure.328 As
324. At least one commentator has agreed that minimal judicial supervision over antitrust
arbitration would ensure that abuses do not occur and that the underlying public interest could
be vindicated without disturbing the beneficial aspects of arbitration. See Allison, supra note 67,
at 270-75.
325. Id. at 270.
326. Id.
327. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
328. See Bowles Financial Group, Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 22 F.3d 1010, 1013-14
(10th Cir. 1994) (holding there is no violation of public policy underlying rules of evidence where
prevailing party's attorney communicated non-prevailing party's settlement offer to arbitrators);
Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 782 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating that an arbi-
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a result, it will be necessary to apply a liberalized standard to the sub-
stantive review of arbitral decisions in antitrust cases. This would per-
mit a reviewing court to vacate any arbitral award that it found to be
inconsistent with either established antitrust precedent or with clearly
enumerated public policies. By allowing for a more liberal mechanism
for the substantive review of arbitral awards involving antitrust issues,
the public interests underlying such disputes will be protected to a
much greater degree than they would be otherwise.
CONCLUSION
Arbitration is increasingly becoming the preferred method of
resolving disputes in modern society. Its advantages as compared to
litigation include expediency, timeliness, and cost-effectiveness.
Given the growing judicial trend toward ordering the arbitration of all
contractual disputes pursuant to broad contractual arbitration clauses,
it is no surprise that statutory claims are becoming increasingly subject
to the reach of arbitration clauses. As a result of the trend toward the
arbitrability of statutory disputes, it is quite likely that domestic anti-
trust claims, which are also statutory in nature, will become univer-
sally subject to arbitration pursuant to such clauses.
Notwithstanding the significant policy implications underlying the
federal antitrust laws, including the public interest in free and fair
competition and the need for effective deterrence of unfair conduct,
providing for the arbitrability of domestic antitrust claims would
clearly result in quicker and cheaper resolutions to these disputes.
Although there exists a possibility that arbitration could result in the
subrogation of the public interests in such disputes, allowing for a
properly administered program of judicial supervision and review of
arbitral decisions involving antitrust issues would alleviate this danger
and benefit the parties involved. Hinging the arbitrability of antitrust
issues on the scope of the parties' contractual relationship ensures that
the parties have some notice of when their antitrust disputes will be
subject to arbitration. As a result, legal effect is given to the inten-
tions of the parties, and the business community can operate more
efficiently during the resolution of the antitrust disputes that will inev-
itably arise.
Eric James Fugisang
tral decision that failed to award statutorily mandated damages for a state securities law viola-
tion did not contravene public policy). Under the Brown rationale, an arbitrator's failure to
award treble damages for an antitrust violation would not likely violate public policy, a result
clearly inconsistent with the spirit and the purpose of the antitrust laws.
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